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This dissertation investigates the relationship between partitioned pricing 
(Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson 1998) and dependent variables such as demand, 
preference, and attention. 
The first essay proposes a theoretical framework to examine extant and new 
moderators of partitioned pricing, classifying moderators based on the source of their 
impact as presentational, evaluative, or attentional. A meta-analysis of 17 years of 
research on partitioned pricing examines 149 observations from 43 studies in 27 
papers (N = 12,878). The perceived benefit of the surcharge and the typicality of 
partitioning the surcharge in the category emerge as robust moderators of the effect of 
partitioned pricing on consumer demand. Surcharges for components perceived to 
provide high benefit and highly typical surcharges make partitioned prices more 
attractive. Replicating the meta-analytic effects of typicality, a follow-up experiment 
shows a more positive effect of partitioning on preference for typical surcharges than 
  
for atypical surcharges, and an eye-tracking experiment offers insight into the 
underlying mechanism by showing that people pay more attention to atypical 
surcharges than to typical surcharges. 
Different pricing strategies in the same market suggest different beliefs about 
the efficacy of partitioning prices on consumers’ preferences. The second essay in 
this dissertation explores the impact of two countervailing theoretical influences that 
may predict how the numerical magnitude of surcharges can affect preferences. “Base 
price anchoring” suggests that as the magnitude of the surcharge increases (holding 
the total price constant), consumers may anchor on a lower base price, leading them 
to evaluate partitioned prices more favorably. In contrast, “surcharge salience” 
suggests that as the magnitude of the surcharge increases, attention to the surcharge 
increases, and evaluations of partitioned prices decrease. An analysis of eBay auction 
data reveals support for the influence of base price anchoring, and a follow-up 
experiment suggests that this mechanism dominates at lower levels of surcharge 
magnitude whereas surcharge salience dominates at higher levels of surcharge 
magnitude. Finally, an eye-tracking study demonstrates the influence of surcharge 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Partitioned pricing occurs when sellers divide the price of a product or service 
into two or more mandatory components (Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson 1998). 
This dissertation includes two essays that investigate the relationship between price 
partitioning and dependent variables such as demand, preference, and attention. 
The first essay reviews the existing literature on partitioned pricing by using 
meta-analytic techniques. Seventeen years have passed since the first paper on 
partitioned pricing, and this essay proposes a theoretical framework to examine extant 
and new moderators of partitioned pricing, classifying moderators based on the 
source of their impact as presentational, evaluative, or attentional: varying the 
presentation, thereby affecting price recall biases and demand; affecting surcharge 
evaluations as more or less acceptable, thereby influencing demand; or affecting the 
attention paid to surcharges, thereby influencing price recall biases and demand. The 
essay then uses meta-analytic techniques to summarize the findings from 43 
published and unpublished studies in 27 papers, with a focus on the previously 
mentioned moderators at the aggregate level. A follow-up experiment probes deeper 
into the source of the effect behind the moderating role of one of the new moderators 
we identify – typicality of partitioning the surcharge – and an eye-tracking 
experiment offers insight into the underlying mechanism by showing that people pay 





Why do some sellers on eBay charge extra for shipping whereas others 
include shipping in their prices? Different pricing strategies in the same market 
suggest different beliefs about the efficacy of partitioning prices on consumers’ 
preferences. The second essay explores the impact of two countervailing theoretical 
influences that may predict how the numerical magnitude of surcharges can affect 
preferences. “Base price anchoring” suggests that as the magnitude of the surcharge 
increases (holding the total price constant), consumers may anchor on a lower base 
price, leading them to evaluate partitioned prices more favorably. In contrast, 
“surcharge salience” suggests that as the magnitude of the surcharge increases, 
attention to the surcharge also increases, potentially decreasing evaluations of 
partitioned prices. This essay uses multiple methods to investigate the relative 
importance of these competing influences on evaluations of partitioned prices, and to 
identify conditions under which each influence dominates. In addition to lab 
experiments, we use eye-tracking to test the effects on attention and eBay data to test 
the external validity of the predictions. 
Together, these essays identify fruitful areas for future research in the field of 
partitioned pricing and provide some evidence for the role of additional moderators – 
such as typicality of partitioning the surcharge and presence of the total price – that 
have not yet been explored in the literature. The use of a meta-analysis allows for a 
more holistic perspective on 17 years of research in the field of partitioned pricing 
and the subsequent use of multiple methods provides convergent evidence for the 





Chapter 2: When Do Partitioned Prices Increase Demand? 
Meta-Analytic and Experimental Evidence 
 
As service providers seek innovative ways to increase their bottom-line, 
consumers have seen a host of surcharges for services that they previously took for 
granted (Mayer 2002). For example, mandatory surcharges add an average of 17% to 
consumers’ wireless bills (Goldman 2013). Surcharges and fees are also common in 
the airline and hotel industries (Carey 2011; Hobica 2013). Although these fees 
appear to help recoup some operating costs in the short run, negative consumer 
reactions may limit revenue, so it is not clear whether adding these fees – rather than 
simply increasing prices – improves firm outcomes. Considering that the U. S. airline, 
wireless telecommunications, and lodging industries have annual revenues of 180 
billion (First Research 2014), 205 billion (Statista 2014) and 163 billion dollars 
(American Hotel & Lodging Association 2014) respectively, differences in 
consumers’ reactions to small surcharges can have a relatively large economic 
impact. 
Partitioned pricing (Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson 1998) offers a relevant 
framework within which to study the impact of mandatory surcharges on consumer 
demand. A partitioned price is defined as a price presentation format in which the 
total price of a product or service is presented in two or more mandatory parts – a 
base price, which is associated with the focal component, and one or more surcharges, 
which are associated with secondary components. Notably, even when the total price 





inclusive or partitioned) influences consumers’ evaluations of offers and purchase 
intentions (e.g., Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson 1998), thereby violating the 
economic principle of descriptive invariance (Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic 1988). 
Although the initial research on partitioned pricing demonstrated that 
surcharges were beneficial to marketers, seventeen years of follow-up research has 
found both beneficial and detrimental effects of partitioned pricing. To more clearly 
understand these effects, this paper uses meta-analytic techniques to summarize the 
findings from 27 papers that empirically test the effect of partitioned pricing on 
demand, with a focus on moderators at the aggregate level. We propose a theoretical 
framework to investigate moderators that have already been explored in extant 
research (surcharge format, surcharge magnitude, surcharge benefit, seller reputation, 
and price level) as well as new moderators that have not yet been explicitly explored 
(presence of the total price, surcharge controllability, and typicality of partitioning the 
surcharge). We classify moderators based on the source of their impact as 
presentational, evaluative, or attentional: varying the presentation, thereby affecting 
price recall biases and demand; affecting surcharge evaluations as more or less 
acceptable, thereby affecting demand; and affecting the attention paid to surcharges, 
thereby affecting price recall biases and demand. 
After identifying multiple moderators from the meta-analysis, we follow up 
with two experimental studies that explicitly manipulate typicality of partitioning to 
demonstrate its effects on demand and eye-tracked attention to the surcharge. The use 





subsequent use of experimental studies provides further evidence for one of the new 
moderators that we identify. 
How Does Partitioned Pricing Affect Consumer Decision-Making? 
Conceptual Background 
The first paper on partitioned pricing was published by Morwitz, Greenleaf, 
and Johnson in 1998. Since then, over 45 published and unpublished papers have 
investigated the impact of partitioned pricing on outcomes such as purchase intention, 
attitude, etc. The initial research focused on price recall biases (e.g., Morwitz, 
Greenleaf, and Johnson 1998; Lee and Han 2002), which led consumers to anchor on 
base prices and under-process surcharges, resulting in lower recalled prices and more 
favorable evaluations when prices were presented in a partitioned format than in an 
all-inclusive format. However, recent research provides more mixed evidence, with 
researchers successfully identifying conditions in which all-inclusive prices lead to 
more favorable evaluations than partitioned prices (e.g., Bertini and Wathieu 2008; 
Burman and Biswas 2007). Much of the research in this area has focused on 
moderators that determine when partitioned prices are evaluated more or less 
favorably than all-inclusive prices. 
To holistically analyze the effects of surcharges, we conduct a meta-analysis 
of results from published and unpublished papers that experimentally examine the 
effects of partitioned pricing. In addition, we examine moderators of the effect. By 
combining papers that have shown similar and opposing findings for the same 





may cause divergent effects. In addition, we examine some previously unexplored 
moderators of theoretical interest, which allows us to extend the literature. 
Presentational Moderators 
These moderators relate to the way in which the pricing information is 
presented, and capture differences in the presentation format of the surcharge as well 
as of the overall total price of a transaction. Based on how the pricing information is 
presented, these moderators affect the price recall bias and thereby affect demand. 
Surcharge format. If the effect of partitioned pricing is due to a cognitive bias, 
the effect should be stronger when surcharge processing is more difficult. 
Accordingly, participants recall a lower total price when surcharges are presented in a 
percentage rather than dollar format (Blanthorne and Roberts 2011; Kim 2006; 
Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson 1998). Previous work has also shown that 
percentage surcharges lead to higher deal evaluations (Wang and Lynn 2010), price 
satisfaction (Xia and Monroe 2004), and purchase intentions (Blanthorne and Roberts 
2011; Kim 2006; Xia and Monroe 2004). Integrating these findings, we propose H1 
as follows: 
H1: Partitioned pricing will have a more positive effect on demand for 
percentage surcharges than for currency surcharges. 
New moderator: Presence of the total price. Although previous research has 
included studies with the total price present (e.g., Cheema 2008; Hamilton and 
Srivastava 2008) and absent (e.g., Lee and Han 2002; Morwitz, Greenleaf, and 
Johnson 1998), there is limited direct research on this effect. For example, Carlson 





present rather than manipulating presence of the total price in a single experiment. 
Xia and Monroe (2004) found that partitioned pricing with the total price present 
raises purchase intention compared to all-inclusive pricing, but the authors did not 
explicitly contrast partitioned pricing with and without the total price. When the total 
price is present, the impact of partitioning may reduce (Morwitz et al. 2009) because 
consumers may not anchor and adjust as proposed by Morwitz, Greenleaf, and 
Johnson (1998) as there is no uncertainty and heuristics apply only under conditions 
of uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Therefore, when the total price is 
present, individuals may be less likely to underestimate the total price, attenuating the 
positive effect of partitioned pricing and leading to H2. 
H2: The presence of the total price will lead to a more negative effect of 
partitioned pricing on demand relative to the absence of the total price. 
Evaluative Moderators 
These moderators relate to the way in which the surcharge information is 
evaluated, and capture differences in judgements about how much value the 
associated components are deemed to provide as well as how acceptable the 
surcharge information is deemed to be. Based on the corresponding evaluative 
judgments, these moderators affect demand. 
Surcharge benefit. Hamilton and Srivastava (2008) found that people are more 
sensitive to the price of low benefit components. For example, participants preferred 
offers in which a higher proportion of the total price was allocated to the focal 
product than to shipping or labor. Similarly, Bertini and Wathieu (2008) show that 





offers high rather than low benefit for the same price, leading to perception of a good 
rather than bad deal. In a partitioned price, the focal component usually offers higher 
benefit than the secondary component, but across the studies that we include in the 
meta-analysis, the secondary component benefit varies, so we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: Partitioned pricing will have a more positive effect on demand for high 
surcharge benefit relative to low surcharge benefit. 
Seller reputation. Consumers who buy from low-reputation sellers pay more 
attention to surcharges than consumers who buy from high-reputation sellers. 
Consistent with this reasoning, Cheema (2008) found a negative effect of partitioning 
on cell phone service sign-up likelihood for low-reputation sellers and no effect for 
high-reputation sellers, and Pan et al. (2013) found similar effects on purchase 
intention. Similarly, Carlson and Weathers (2008) found that perceived price fairness 
and purchase intentions were higher when more trustworthy sellers (vs. less 
trustworthy sellers) partitioned prices, but they did not compare partitioned prices 
with all-inclusive prices. Combining these findings, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: Partitioned pricing will have a more positive effect on demand for high 
seller reputation relative to low seller reputation. 
New moderator: Surcharge controllability. Morwitz et al. (2009) suggest that 
consumer attributions about who is responsible for a surcharge – firms vs. other 
sources – may play a role in consumers’ reactions to partitioned pricing. Folkes 





uncontrollable by a firm as more legitimate than those due to reasons that are 
controllable by the firm (e.g., desire for greater profits; Campbell 1999). Thus, 
consumers may react more favorably to the partitioning of components that they 
believe are uncontrollable by the firm (e.g., taxes listed separately by airlines and 
wireless providers). 
Indeed, Bambauer-Sachse and Mangold (2010) find that marketers’ 
responsibility for surcharges increases the negative effects of partitioned pricing. 
Similar research suggests that consumers react negatively to shipping charges when 
they believe that these are presented for adding to marketers’ profits (Schindler, 
Morrin, and Bechwati 2005). These findings suggest that when consumers encounter 
highly controllable surcharges, they might attribute partitioned pricing to firms’ 
profit-making motives, resulting in more unfavorable reactions than when they 
encounter less controllable surcharges, and leading to H5. 
H5: Partitioned pricing will have a more negative effect on demand for 
surcharges with high controllability relative to surcharges with low 
controllability. 
Attentional Moderators 
These moderators relate to the amount of attention that is paid to the 
surcharge, and capture differences in attention due to the salience of the pricing 
information because of factors such as numerical magnitude of the pricing 
information or the inconsistency of the pricing information with prior expectations. 
Based on the attention captured by the surcharge, these moderators affect price recall 





evaluations due to fairness perceptions, and thereby affect demand. 
Surcharge magnitude. Prior research suggests that the size of the surcharge, 
often referred to as the “surcharge magnitude,” may influence demand when 
consumers encounter a partitioned price. Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson (1998) 
suggest that consumers anchor on base prices and insufficiently adjust for surcharges. 
For a given total price (base price plus surcharge), higher surcharge magnitude (SM) 
should reduce base price anchors and price estimates, and raise demand. Consistent 
with this, authors (e.g., Hossain & Morgan 2006) have found positive effects of 
shipping fee on demand. On the other hand, higher SM may also raise surcharge 
salience, lead to more complete processing, and attenuate recall biases. Additionally, 
price unfairness perceptions (e.g., Campbell 1999) may increase, leading to more 
negative effects (e.g., Cheema 2008; Xia and Monroe 2004). Therefore, partitioned 
pricing may have a positive effect when SM is low, but a negative effect when SM is 
high (Sheng, Bao, and Pan 2007). 
Although the partitioned pricing literature has used absolute surcharge 
magnitude (ASM) and relative surcharge magnitude (RSM; ASM as a percentage of 
base price), it does not explicitly distinguish between them except in Chatterjee 
(2010). In our meta-analysis, base prices vary widely, making the ASM-RSM 
distinction relevant, so we include both, and propose the following competing 
hypotheses for their positive vs. negative moderating roles: 






H6b: As ASM increases, partitioned pricing will have a more negative effect 
on demand. 
H7a: As RSM increases, partitioned pricing will have a more positive effect 
on demand. 
H7b: As RSM increases, partitioned pricing will have a more negative effect 
on demand. 
Price level. Consistent with the salience-based effects of RSM, Roggeveen, 
Xia, and Monroe (2006) suggested that partitioning will be more effective at higher 
price levels because the same ASM will be less salient, and found support for their 
prediction. Along similar lines, Chatterjee (2010) found that a higher price level led 
to a less negative effect of partitioning on perceived deal value and purchase intention 
when the surcharge was relatively high. Building on these findings, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H8: As the price level increases, partitioned pricing will have a more positive 
effect on demand. 
New moderator: Typicality of partitioning. Norms guide consumers’ 
expectations for partitioned components (Hamilton and Srivastava 2008; Redden, 
Fitzsimons, and Williams 2007). For example, in Hamilton and Srivastava’s (2008) 
second study, participants were less likely to choose a supplier offering free labor 
(relative to another supplier who charged 43% of the total price for labor) when they 
believed that free labor was less common. This suggests that descriptive norms 
influence consumers’ responses to partitioned prices. 





1976) has found that instances of a natural category can be judged as more or less 
typical (good or bad examples) of the category. Consumers “perceive members of 
most naturally occurring categories as varying in their degree of typicality, or 
representativeness, of those categories,” (Boush and Loken 1991), and this extends to 
product categories (Loken and Ward 1990). We define the typicality of partitioning a 
surcharge as the degree to which partitioning a surcharge is the norm for a particular 
product category. When partitioning is the norm, typicality is high and when it is not 
the norm, typicality is low. When typicality is low (in other words, when partitioning 
is atypical), it may increase attention to the surcharge due to the greater salience of 
inconsistent information (Lynch and Srull 1982). However, when typicality is high 
(in other words, when partitioning is typical), it should not increase attention to the 
surcharge. More attention to the surcharge makes price recall biases less likely to 
occur, attenuating the effect of partitioning for atypically partitioned surcharges. 
Atypical partitioning may also violate consumers’ injunctive norms (Cialdini, Reno, 
and Kallgren 1990) and lead to perceived unfairness, again attenuating the positive 
effect of partitioning. Therefore, we propose that:  
H9: Partitioned pricing will have a more positive effect on demand for 
typical surcharges relative to atypical surcharges. 
Extant research has also examined the number of surcharges (e.g., Xia and 
Monroe 2004), need for cognition (e.g., Cheema 2008), surcharge fairness (Sheng, 
Bao, and Pan 2007), surcharge reasonableness (e.g., Burman and Biswas 2007), 
recall-driven vs. stimulus-driven information (e.g., Kim 2006), construal level 





Rubaltelli, and Tedeschi 2010). Our meta-analysis only considered factors that had 
been manipulated in at least two papers included in the analysis (as in Krishna et al. 
2002; to ensure that inferences were not based on a single paper), factors that we had 
specific hypotheses about, or factors that could be coded directly from the papers. 
Number of surcharges, need for cognition, recall- vs. stimulus-based information, 
construal level, and hedonic vs. utilitarian category were manipulated in only one 
paper. Moreover, because prior work has operationalized surcharge fairness (Sheng, 
Bao, and Pan 2007) and reasonableness (Burman and Biswas 2007) by manipulating 
SM, we felt that ASM and RSM sufficiently captured these constructs and we did not 
include separate variables to capture them. 
In the next section, we describe the procedure that we employed for the meta-
analysis. 
Meta-Analysis 
Data and Methodology 
Identifying articles to include. As a starting point, the Business Source 
database was searched in November 2013 to identify relevant articles in the Journal 
of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Consumer Research, and 
Marketing Science. We then did a cited reference search for each of the identified 
journal articles to locate additional papers in additional marketing/consumer journals 
(e.g., Journal of Consumer Psychology). Further, we searched the Association of 
Consumer Research (ACR) and American Marketing Association (AMA) conference 
proceedings as well as Google Scholar and SSRN as of November 2013. In addition, 





reviewed research on partitioned pricing. We also sent out a call for published and 
unpublished studies in January 2014 on the AMA, ACR, and Society for Judgment 
and Decision Making (SJDM) mailing lists. Additionally, we directly contacted 
authors who had previously published in the area to see if they had unpublished work 
and for stimuli details. Finally, in June 2014, we checked if any unpublished papers 
had been published and updated our analysis accordingly. 
We initially reviewed a super-set of over 45 published and working papers 
(details available on request). Of these, some used partitioned prices, but did not 
contrast them with all-inclusive prices (e.g., Estelami 2003), so it was not possible to 
calculate the effect size for partitioned pricing, leaving 28 usable papers. Of these 28 
papers, one paper did not have complete information about the stimuli, so we could 
not include this paper in our analysis, resulting in 27 papers that we could include. Of 
the 27 papers, some report multiple studies, so 43 studies could be included in our 
meta-analysis. If the authors made multiple comparisons between partitioned and all-
inclusive prices (at different levels of potential moderators), we included effect sizes 
for each comparison as separate observations. When authors made multiple 
comparisons involving the same baseline (all-inclusive) condition (e.g., Xia and 
Monroe 2004), we included effect sizes from all comparisons, but used a control 
variable to identify such cases. When studies had multiple dependent measures, we 
included them as suggested by Bijmolt and Peters (2001), leading to 149 observations 
across the 43 studies, which is comparable to recent meta-analyses of experimental 
studies (63 observations from 50 studies in Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd 





observations from 53 studies in Chernev, Böckenholt, and Goodman (2014)). Using a 
hierarchical linear model (HLM), we controlled for correlations between 
observations, but we also checked for robustness by using an alternative model that 
included only one measure per combination of moderator levels. Table 1 contains the 
details of the papers and studies that we could include in the meta-analysis. 
 
TABLE 1 
META-ANALYSIS: PAPERS AND STUDIES USED, ALONG WITH NUMBER 
OF OBSERVATIONS PER STUDY 
Authors Year Study 
# of 
Observations 
Albinsson, Burman, and Das 2010 1 4 
Albinsson, Burman, and Das 2010 2 4 
Baghi, Rubaltelli, and Tedeschi 2010 1 4 
Baghi, Rubaltelli, and Tedeschi 2010 2 4 
Bambauer-Sachse and Mangold 2010 1 2 
Bertini and Wathieu  2008 1 4 
Bertini and Wathieu  2008 3 4 
Blanthorne and Roberts 2011 1 8 
Burman and Biswas  2007 1 8 
Burman and Biswas  2007 2 8 
Burman and Biswas  2007 3 8 
Burman and Biswas  2007 4 8 
Chakravarti, Krish, Paul, and 
Srivastava  
2002 1 1 
Chakravarti, Krish, Paul, and 
Srivastava  
2002 2 1 
Chatterjee 2010 1 8 
Cheema  2008 2 2 
de Faria 2010 Part A 4 
Hamilton and Srivastava  2008 2 2 
Hossain and Morgan 2006 1 6 
Kim  2006 1 4 





Authors Year Study 
# of 
Observations 
Lee and Han 2002 1 5 
Lee, Choi, and Li 2014 2 2 
Lee, Choi, and Li 2014 3 4 
Lee, Choi, and Li 2014 4 4 
Love 2012 1 2 
Love 2012 2 2 
Love 2012 3 2 
Lynn and Wang 2013 1 2 
Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson  1998 2 1 
Muthitacharoen, Zhang, and 
Gillenson 
2013 1 2 
Pan, Kuo, Pan, and Tu 2013 2 2 
Redden, Fitzsimons, and Williams  2007 1 3 
Redden, Fitzsimons, and Williams  2007 2 3 
Sahay, Mukherjee, and Diwani 2014 1 1 
Sahay, Mukherjee, and Diwani 2014 2 1 
Schindler, Morrin, and Bechwati  2005 1 1 
Sheng, Bao, and Pan  2007 1 3 
Sheng, Bao, and Pan  2007 2 2 
Sheng, Bao, and Pan  2007 3 4 
Völckner, Rühle, and Spann 2012 1 1 
Xia and Monroe  2004 1 4 
Yao and Zhang 2012 1 1 
Total 27 43 149 
 
Some studies that we included reported statistics without the degrees of 
freedom so, in such cases, we assumed that the cell sizes were the same for all cells of 
a factorial design when cell sizes were not provided. For example, Study 2 in Lee, 
Choi, and Lee (2014) had data from 99 participants as part of a 2 (partitioned vs. all-
inclusive) × 2 (global vs. local processing) design. We assumed the cell sizes for the 
global and local processing conditions to be 49.5 each. 
Coding of moderators. After identifying the studies to be included, we coded 





provided in the studies. Some moderators could be coded directly from the papers; 
others required subjective judgment and a team of independent judges coded them. 
We contrast-coded moderators such as surcharge format (currency vs. 
percentage), seller reputation (high vs. low), and total price (present vs. absent) even 
if they were not manipulated, so that we could test their effects across studies. 
Although price level has been explored as a categorical factor, we coded this as a 
continuous variable for greater inferential power. Similarly, we coded ASM and RSM 
as continuous variables. ASM (and RSM) details were not available for two studies, 
so the final analysis included 149 observations from 43 studies in 27 papers. 
Two independent judges who were blind to the hypotheses coded surcharge 
benefit, surcharge controllability, and typicality of partitioning (reliability indices = 
.85, .78, and .81; Perreault and Leigh 1989). Judges coded these variables because 
they required subjective judgment, unlike other moderators that could be objectively 
coded. A third independent judge’s coding was used to resolve inconsistencies. Due 
to research assistant turnover, only one judge coded data for some observations, but 
reliability was tested against the first author’s independent coding for these 
observations (reliability indices = .86, .91, and .91; Perreault and Leigh 1989). 
Coding of control variables. Following published meta-analyses (e.g., Krishna 
et al. 2002; Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd 2010), we also included several 
control variables. Authors used different dependent measures to capture the effects of 
partitioned pricing on demand, such as Purchase Intention (or a consistent scale-item 
measure such as Preference, Offer Attractiveness, Liking of Offer, or Attitude), Choice, 





observations where authors studied the effect of partitioned pricing on dependent 
measures such as surcharge fairness or attention to the surcharge as these measures 
relate to the surcharge rather than to the overall offer. We adapted procedures used in a 
meta-analysis by Krishna et al. (2002), and employed a contrast-coded variable to 
capture whether the meta-analytic results were sensitive to the type of dependent 
measure used (scale vs. non-scale). In line with Krishna et al. (2002), we employed 
another contrast-coded variable to test whether our results were sensitive to using 
single-item or multiple-item scales for scale-item measures. To control for study 
complexity, we also included the number of variables manipulated as in Krishna et al. 
(2002). Additionally, in line with the meta-analysis by Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and 
Todd (2010), we included control variables for the year of publication, whether the 
paper was published in a journal, and whether the study was conducted in the US. 
Finally, we included control variables for within-subject effect sizes and multiple 
observations with the same baseline (all-inclusive) condition. Table 2 contains the 
details of the coding schemes for the moderators and control variables and Table 3 













META-ANALYSIS: LEVELS, FREQUENCY, CODING, AND VARIANCE 










     
MODERATORS     
     
Surcharge format   How the surcharge 
was presented 
Coded for all 
papers 




 Currency (-1) 131 Surcharge was 
presented as currency 
 
 None (0) 5 Both levels included in 
comparison 
 
     
Presence of total 
price 
  Whether the total price 
is also provided or not 
Coded for all 
papers 
 Present (1) 14 Total price for the 
product is explicitly 
presented 
 
 Absent (-1) 135 Total price for the 
product is not 
explicitly presented 
 
     
Surcharge 
benefit 
  Whether the secondary 
component provides 
tangible benefits to 
consumers 
Coded for all 
papers 
 High (1) 22 e.g., Surge Protector  
 Low (-1) 120 e.g., Taxes  
 None (0) 7 No information 
provided regarding 
nature of secondary 
component, e.g., 
surcharge; or contrast 
includes high and low 
















     
Seller reputation   Reputation of the 
seller 
 
 High (1) 2 Seller reputation is 
high 
Cheema (2008), 
Pan et al. (2013) 





Pan et al. (2013) 
 None (0) 139 No information 
provided 
 
     
Surcharge 
controllability 
  Whether the secondary 
component is 
controllable by the 
firm providing the 
product/service 
Coded for all 
papers 
 High (1) 113 e.g., processing fees  
 Low (-1) 7 e.g., taxes  
 None (0) 29 No information 
provided regarding 
nature of secondary 
component, e.g., 






     
ASM Continuous 149 Absolute magnitude of 
the first surcharge 
Coded for all 
papers 
     
RSM Continuous 149 Relative magnitude of 
the first surcharge as a 
percentage of the base 
price 
Coded for all 
papers 
     
Price level Continuous 149 Total price level for 
the partitioned 
condition 
Coded for all 
papers 
     
















  Whether the secondary 
component is typically 
partitioned or not 
Coded for all 
papers 
 High (1) 116 e.g., Shipping  




 None (0) 15 No information 
provided regarding 
nature of secondary 
component, e.g., 
surcharge; or contrast 










To account for study 
idiosyncrasies  
     
Common control    Varied within 
and across 
papers 
 Yes (1) 26 The control condition 
was used for multiple 
comparisons 
 
 No (-1) 123 The control condition 
was not used for 
multiple comparisons 
 




   Varied within 
and across 
papers 
 Scale-item (1) 120 The DV was a scale-





 Others (-1) 29 The DV was not a 
scale-item (e.g., 
Choice, WTP, 
Recalled Cost)  
 
















   Varied within 
and across 
papers 
 Yes (1) 90 The scale used to 
measure the DV had 
multiple scale-items 
 
 No (-1) 30 The scale used to 
measure the DV had 
one scale-item 
 
 None (0) 29 DV is not a scale-item  




Continuous 149 The number of 
independent variables 
manipulated by the 




     
Published    Varied across 
papers 
 Yes (1) 125 The paper was 
published in a journal 
 
 No (-1) 24 The paper was not 
published in a journal 
 
     
Study outside 
US 
   Varied across 
papers 
 Yes (1) 24 The study was run 
outside the USA 
 
 No (-1) 125 The study was run in 
the USA 
 
     
Within-subject    Varied within 
and across 
papers 
 Yes (1) 16 The effect was within-
subject 
 
 No (-1) 133 The effect was 
between subjects 
 
     
Year of study Continuous 149 The year in which the 
results were reported; 







META-ANALYSIS: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES († p < .01, * p < .05) 
  ASM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
(1) Benefit .22
†












                           






                         
(5) RSM -.02 .05 .10 -.10 -.30
†
                       
(6) Seller 
reputation 
.13 .08 -.08 .06 .13 -.29
†
                     




 .04 .01 .14 .05                   
(8) Typicality -.09 -.38
†
 -.03 .01 .03 .04 -.08 .09                 
(9) Common 
control 
.04 .08 -.15 .20
*
 .05 -.04 .07 .09 .13               
(10) DV type -.15 -.21
†













           









 .03 -.12 -.07 -.04 .11 -.21
†
 -.10         




































 .06 -.11 -.18
*




 .15 .14   
(16) Year -.16
*
 -.02 .03 -.29
†
 -.01 -.07 .13 .21
†









Procedures. For the meta-analysis, we used an HLM (e.g., Bijmolt, van 
Heerde, and Pieters 2005) that was estimated by restricted maximum likelihood 
estimation with the lmerTest.lmer function in R. Different studies provided statistics 





 statistics. To standardize the effects, we transformed these statistics into our 
dependent measure, Cohen’s d (as in Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd (2010)), a 
standardized measure of the mean differences between the partitioned and all-
inclusive conditions, with the difference scaled by the pooled standard deviation 




 lose effect direction 
information due to squaring (Rosenthal and DiMatteo 2001). Pearson r is also used in 
meta-analyses, but is more suited to testing the effect of a continuous variable on 
another continuous variable. Although we assumed equal cell sizes when sizes were 
not stated, computing Cohen’s d required us to round some cell sizes to the nearest 
integer. We then used the correction procedure specified by Hedges and Olkin (1985) 
to correct for small-sample bias. Finally, considering the range of sample sizes, more 
weight should be given to effect size estimates from larger samples due to greater 
precision (Rao and Monroe 1989), so we weighted the effect sizes by their inverse 
variance (see Hedges and Olkin 1985, p. 49), for which we again assumed equal cell 
sizes, leading to a weighted, small-sample bias-corrected Cohen’s d as our dependent 
measure. 
Meta-analyses may involve data from between-subjects and within-subject 
experimental designs. Effect size estimates depend on the type of experimental design 





difference can lead to inaccurate effect size estimates (Dunlap et al. 1996), so we 
calculate effect sizes differently for between-subjects data and within-subject data, 
and the control variable that we used for between- vs. within-subjects designs should 
capture any residual effects. Figure 1 summarizes our meta-analysis framework, and 
Appendices 1 and 2 contain the data for the meta-analysis. 
 
FIGURE 1 
META-ANALYSIS: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Note: Underlined text denotes new theoretical moderators (Presence of total 
price, Surcharge controllability, and Typicality of partitioning) and italics denote 








Robustness checks and additional analyses. We ran a series of checks to test the 
robustness of our results to various decisions that we made, and we also conducted 
some additional analyses. First, we used an alternative mixed-effects model (e.g., 
Viechtbauer 2010), which assumed independent observations (within-observation 
variance was calculated from Cohen’s d and sample size as in Hedges and Olkin 1985). 
Second, we estimated the same mixed-effects model with only one dependent measure 
for each combination of moderator levels in a study, leading to 90 independent 
observations. 
Third, to test for higher-order effects, we noted the significant theoretical factors 
(benefit, price level, presence of the total price, and typicality) in our original HLM. 
We then estimated an interaction HLM by adding the two-way interactions between 
benefit, price level, presence of the total price, and typicality to the original HLM. 
Fourth, we estimated an HLM including the theoretical factors but excluding 
the control variables. Fifth, because there is no direct test for multicollinearity in 
HLMs (Eisend 2014), we identified factors that were correlated with |r|s ≥ .5 (as in 
Eisend 2014; ASM and price level, r = .76) and estimated HLMs with one of the 
variables removed. Sixth, although ASM and RSM were not correlated in the data (r 
= -.02, p > .78), these constructs are conceptually related, so we estimated an HLM 
with only ASM (but not RSM) included in addition to the other variables. Finally, we 






Overall effect of partitioned pricing. Our initial HLM correctly predicted the 
direction of 70% of the effects, but the mean effect size of partitioned pricing was .08 
(p > .10), which is not significantly different from zero. This could be either because 
the true effect size for each observation is not significantly different from zero or 
because the true effect sizes for different observations have opposite signs and their 
influences cancel each other out in the estimation of the mean effect size. Considering 
the number of studies that have shown significant positive and negative effects of 
partitioned pricing, it is clear that the latter explanation is true. Both the Q-statistic, 
which tests for effect-size heterogeneity and follows a chi-square distribution (Cochran 
1954; Q(148) = 909.1, p < .001), and the I
2
 statistic, which denotes the amount of 
variance due to effect-size heterogeneity (Huedo-Medina et al. 2006; I
2
 = 83.72%; high 
heterogeneity), confirm this conclusion, so we examine the effects of moderators for 
more insight. 
Effects of moderators. Table 4 lists the predicted effects from extant literature 













META-ANALYSIS: EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON DEMAND 




βj SE(βj) t-statistic p-value 
Intercept + 0.08 0.05 1.67 0.1 
Control Variables 
     
  Common Control ? 0.004 0.07 0.05 0.96 
  Dependent Variable Type ? -0.22 0.05 -4.8 < .0001 
  Multiple Scale Items ? -0.08 0.07 -1.14 0.26 
  No. of Variables 
Manipulated 
? -0.08 0.05 -1.6 0.11 
  Published + 0.11 0.09 1.19 0.24 
  Study Outside US ? 0.06 0.09 0.71 0.48 
  Within-Subject ? -0.13 0.1 -1.32 0.19 
  Year of Study – -0.05 0.02 -2.7 0.01 
Theoretical Moderators 
     
  Format + 0.01 0.1 0.13 0.9 
  Total Price Present – -0.16 0.09 -1.68 0.097 
  Benefit + 0.28 0.09 3.12 0.002 
  Seller Reputation + 0.28 0.2 1.4 0.17 
  Controllability – -0.1 0.1 -0.97 0.34 
  ASM ? 0.001 0 0.31 0.76 
  RSM ? -0.001 0 -0.33 0.74 
  Price Level + 0.0004 0 1.72 0.09 
  Typicality + 0.29 0.1 2.91 0.005 
 
 
Among the control variables, the type of dependent measure (β = -.22, p < .001) 
and the year of publication (β = -.05, p < .01) are significant (other ps > .11), suggesting 
that partitioned pricing has a less favorable effect on demand when scale measures are 
used and in studies conducted more recently. The less favorable effect of partitioning 
when scale measures are used might be because non-scale measures such as choice, 





robust across all our checks. The effect of year is consistent with Scheibehenne, 
Greifeneder and Todd (2010) and the Proteus phenomenon proposed by Ioannidis and 
Trikalinos (2005), and this result is robust in all but one of our checks. 
Examining the presentational moderators, supporting H2, the coefficient for 
presence of the total price is negative (β = -.16, p = .097), suggesting that partitioning 
has a less favorable effect on demand when the total price is present, perhaps because 
any price recall biases are attenuated. Based on the contrast coding scheme that we 
used, the effect size difference when the total price is present vs. when the total price is 
absent is .32 Cohen’s d units, which corresponds to 8% of the Cohen’s d range (-2, 2). 
Based on Cohen’s guidelines for interpreting d (.2 = small, .5 = moderate, and .8 = 
large; Cohen 1992), this is between a small and a moderate effect size difference, and 
this result is significant in five of the eight robustness checks. 
Turning to the evaluative moderators, supporting H3, the coefficient for 
surcharge benefit is positive (β = .28, p = .002), suggesting that high benefit surcharges 
increase evaluations of partitioned pricing relative to low benefit surcharges. This is 
consistent with previous work showing that partitioned prices result in more favorable 
evaluations when the partitioned component offers a high rather than a low level of 
benefit (Hamilton and Srivastava 2008), leading to perception of a good deal rather 
than a bad deal (Bertini and Wathieu 2008). Due to the contrast coding scheme that we 
used, the effect size difference between low-benefit and high-benefit surcharges is 
twice the benefit coefficient and equals .56 Cohen’s d units, which corresponds to 14% 
of the Cohen’s d range (-2, 2) and a moderate effect size difference. This result is 





Examining the attentional moderators, supporting H8, the coefficient for price 
level is positive (β = .0004, p = .09), suggesting that a $100 increase in price level 
increases the effect size of partitioned pricing on demand by .04 Cohen’s d units, which 
corresponds to 1% of the Cohen’s d range (-2, 2). This appears to be a small effect size 
difference and it is significant in only two of our robustness checks. Nevertheless, the 
result is consistent with previous research that has found partitioning to be more 
effective at higher price levels (e.g., Roggeveen, Xia, and Monroe 2006).  
Finally, supporting H9, the coefficient for typicality of partitioning is positive (β 
= .29, p = .005), suggesting that partitioning has a more favorable effect on demand 
when surcharges are typically partitioned than when they are not typically partitioned. 
For example, partitioned prices should lead to greater demand over all-inclusive prices 
when surcharges are typical (e.g., taxes) than when they are atypical (e.g., cell phone 
Web features). The effect size difference between partitioning with typical and atypical 
surcharges is .58 Cohen’s d units, which corresponds to 15% of the Cohen’s d range (-
2, 2). Considering that this is a moderate effect size, and that typicality of partitioning 
has not been extensively studied, this moderator holds promise as a fruitful avenue for 
future research. This result is significant across all of the robustness checks we 
employed. 
For the meta-analysis, we computed the bias-adjusted, weighted Cohen’s d for 
the DV difference between partitioned and all-inclusive conditions for each 
observation. In order to provide a more managerial interpretation than Cohen’s d for the 
moderator effects, we reverse-computed the % increases in DV corresponding to 





four theoretical moderators. This computation requires DV std. dev. data, but only 38 
observations in our data set provided this data, and the corresponding demand increases 
ranged from 1% to 136%, 1% to 238%, 0% to 17%, and 1% to 246% respectively, 
providing some benchmarks for managers to make trade-offs while deciding which 
moderators to focus their resources on. 
Robustness checks. Across the robustness checks, we were able to generally 
replicate the results of the meta-analysis in terms of prediction accuracy, coefficient 
magnitude, significance, and RMSE. However, the HLM with only theoretical factors 
predicted only 61% of the effect directions, and the non-weighted HLM predicted only 
42% and also had a large RMSE. Notably, the coefficient for typicality remained 
significant across all robustness checks and the coefficient for benefit remained 
significant across all robustness checks except for the non-weighted effect size HLM. 
The sample sizes used for weighting the effect sizes varied from 27 to 512, so it is not 
surprising that the effects in the HLM with non-weighted effect sizes differed from the 
effects in the original HLM. In the interaction model, none of the six two-way 
interactions was significant (ps > .11). Table 5 summarizes the results of the robustness 












META-ANALYSIS: RESULTS OF ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Note: **** p < .001, ***  .001 ≤ p < .01, **    .01 ≤ p < .05, *      .05 ≤ p < .10 
 





HLM (original model) -.22**** -.05*** .0004* .28*** -.16* .29*** 
Mixed model assuming 
independence 
-.27**** -.04*** .0003 .28**** -.16** .26*** 
Mixed model with 
independent observations 
(N = 90) 
-.22** -.05** .0003 .32*** -.18* .33*** 
HLM with interactions -.23**** -.05*** .0002 .34*** -.10 .30** 
HLM with only 
theoretical moderators 
N. A. N. A. .0002 .26*** -.22** .23** 
HLM without ASM -.22**** -.05*** .0004** .29*** -.16* .29*** 
HLM without price level -.23**** -.04** N. A. .26*** -.15 .30*** 
HLM without RSM -.22**** -.05*** .0004* .28*** -.17* .29*** 
HLM with non-weighted 
Cohen's d 
-.26**** -.02 .0003 .19 -.02 .24* 
 
Discussion 
This meta-analysis examines the overall effect of partitioned pricing as well as 
presentational, evaluative, and attentional moderators: surcharge format and presence 
of total price; surcharge benefit, seller reputation, and surcharge controllability; and 
ASM, RSM, price level, and typicality of partitioning. From the meta-analysis, the 
overall effect of partitioned pricing was not significant, but the coefficients for 
surcharge benefit and typicality of partitioning were significant across a variety of 
robustness checks, suggesting that they play an important role in explaining differences 





significant and less robust, suggesting that they might play a role in explaining 
differences across observations, but more research is needed to draw firm conclusions. 
Although we tried to perform a comprehensive meta-analysis, we may have 
missed some studies. One limitation of our meta-analysis is that 84% of our data is 
from published sources, leading to the possibility of a selection bias due to the relative 
absence of null-result, file-drawer studies that might have dampened the estimates of 
overall effect size. To address this concern, our call for papers included a call for 
unpublished work. Moreover, our proportion of published vs. unpublished work is 
similar to that of other meta-analyses (e.g., 91% in Bijmolt, van Heerde, and Peters 
(2005) and 91% in Sethuraman, Tellis, and Briesch (2011)). Considering that the 
overall effect size estimate was not significantly different from zero, the influence of 
file-drawer studies on the overall effect size might be negligible. However, it is possible 
that these file-drawer studies might yield some useful insights on the effects of the 
moderators. 
Another limitation is that there was very little variance across observations for 
moderators such as surcharge format, seller reputation, and surcharge controllability. 
This was because although we contrast-coded (rather than dummy-coded) these and 
other moderators to maximize the number of observations in the meta-analysis, they 
either had fewer non-zero values or less variance between non-zero values than other 
moderators such as surcharge benefit and typicality of partitioning. This might explain 
why some of the factors that have been found to have significant effects in previous 
studies did not show significant effects in the meta-analysis. These non-significant 





moderators. We tested for two-way interactions between the four moderators that were 
significant in the meta-analysis, but none of the interactions was significant. Future 
research could test these effects further by experimentally manipulating pairs of these 
and other moderators. 
Although the meta-analysis shows typicality to be a moderator of partitioned 
pricing, it is a new construct that we introduced by coding stimuli from extant 
research so, to replicate the meta-analytic findings, we experimentally manipulated 
typicality in two follow-up studies. In line with recent practices (LeBel et al. 2013; 
Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn 2012), we report all data exclusions, stopping 
rules, measures, covariates, manipulations, and sample size determinations for our 
studies. 
Experiment 1: The Moderating Effect of Typicality on Demand 
The meta-analysis shows that typical surcharges increase the effect of 
partitioned pricing relative to atypical surcharges. However, this could be because 
partitioning has a positive effect for typical surcharges and a weaker positive effect, a 
null effect, or a negative effect for atypical surcharges. This could also be because 
partitioning has a null effect for typical surcharges and a negative effect for atypical 
surcharges or because it has a weaker negative effect for typical surcharges than for 
atypical surcharges. Therefore, this study was designed to shed light on how the 
relative effect sizes of partitioned pricing for typical and atypical surcharges drive the 
overall effect. Additionally, in the meta-analysis, variation in typicality was due to 





and manipulate typicality using norms, by showing that competitors use either 
partitioned or non-partitioned prices. 
Participants and Procedure 
Participants were recruited via MTurk to complete an online study for $.50. 
Sample size was predetermined to be 200, and data collection stopped at 200 
responses; however, two MTurkers completed the study without submitting the 
MTurk HIT, leading to 202 responses (68% female, ages 18 to 63, Mage = 31.6). 
Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (price 
presentation: all-inclusive, partitioned) × 2 (typicality of partitioning: typical, 
atypical) between-subjects design. Participants were asked to imagine that they would 
be spending a few weeks in India, and that they were searching for a return flight 
from Delhi to Washington, DC. They were informed that a friend who had traveled to 
India suggested MakeMyTrip.com for the best fares. To manipulate typicality, we 
adapted a norms manipulation from Redden, Fitzsimons, and Williams (2007). 
Participants saw reference flights for competitors that were associated with four 
different airline logos and prices. In the typical partitioning conditions, all reference 
flights had a base price (range: $731.69 to $751.69) and a taxes surcharge (range: 
$38.88 to $34.88), making partitioning typical. In the atypical partitioning conditions, 
the prices of all reference flights were all-inclusive (same total price range: $770.57 
to $786.57), making partitioning atypical. Participants then saw the target airline logo 
and price, which was either all-inclusive or partitioned. 
In the partitioned presentation conditions, the target airline, Air India, had a 





presentation conditions, it had a single price ($778.57). Thus, price presentation of the 
target flight either matched that of the reference flights (both target and reference 
flights were partitioned or both were all-inclusive) or it did not match. Next, 
participants responded to dependent measures for purchase intention, offer 
evaluation, attention to the surcharge (partitioned conditions only), and a typicality 
manipulation check. They also responded to control measures for flight quality, 
expected size of a typical taxes surcharge, surcharge benefit, fairness (partitioned 
conditions only), experience purchasing airline tickets, comprehension (based on 
Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009, but used as a potential covariate rather 
than as a filter), and demographics. 
An exploratory factor analysis revealed that the scale-items for purchase 
intention and offer evaluation loaded on a single factor (loadings > .89), so they were 
averaged to form a preference index (α = .95). Figure 2 lists the dependent measures 





























EXPERIMENT 1: CONDITION-WISE MEANS (STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
FOR DEPENDENT MEASURES 
MEASURE 
Typical Atypical 
All-inclusive Partitioned All-inclusive Partitioned 
(n = 49) (n = 49) (n = 53) (n = 51) 
Preference 
4.6 5.2 5.3 5.3 
(1.54) (1.40) (.99) (1.29) 





Typicality of partitioning 
5.8 6.2 3.6 4.2 
(1.36) (1.36) (2.13) (2.06) 
Flight quality 
4.7 4.9 4.8 4.9 
(1.05) (1.10) (.96) (1.13) 
Typical taxes surcharge 
$64  $57  $58  $40  
($133) ($113) ($68) ($27) 
Surcharge benefit 
2.6 2.5 3.0 2.4 
(1.40) (1.53) (1.59) (1.33) 







3.9 3.7 3.7 3.3 
(1.71) (1.93) (1.90) (1.53) 
 
Analysis and Results 
All data were analyzed at one shot after data collection stopped. Degrees of 
freedom vary across some of the analyses due to missing responses. 
Manipulation check. A 2 (price presentation: all-inclusive, partitioned) × 2 
(typicality: typical, atypical) between-subjects ANOVA on the typicality measure 
revealed the expected effect of typicality (F(1, 198) = 67.23, p < .001, η
2
p = .25) and 
an effect of price presentation (F(1, 198) = 4.49, p = .04, η
2
p = .02). Typicality was 





and higher in the partitioned conditions (M = 5.2) than in the all-inclusive conditions 
(M = 4.6); however, the interaction was not significant (p > .62), indicating a 
successful manipulation of typicality across both price presentation conditions. 
Preference. The same 2 × 2 ANOVA on preference revealed an effect of 
typicality (F(1, 198) = 5.10, p = .03, η
2
p = .03) and a marginal interaction between 
typicality and price presentation (F(1, 198) = 3.11, p = .08, η
2
p = .02). Preference was 
lower in the typical condition (M = 4.9) than in the atypical condition (M = 5.3). 
Consistent with H4 and the meta-analysis, planned comparisons revealed a significant 
effect of price presentation in the typical conditions (F(1, 96) = 4.16, p = .04, d = .40), 
but not in the atypical conditions (F(1, 102) = .04, p > .83, d < .07). Specifically, 
atypicality attenuates the effect of partitioned pricing: in the typical conditions, 
partitioning increased preference (M = 5.2) relative to all-inclusive presentation (M = 
4.6) but, in the atypical conditions, there was no difference (Ms = 5.3 and 5.3), 
suggesting a positive effect of partitioning for typical surcharges and a null effect for 
atypical surcharges. 
Preference was not correlated with experience, the comprehension check, or 
any of the demographic variables except gender (r = -.17, p = .02). Including gender 
as a covariate does not substantively change the results (price presentation effect: p = 
.06 in the typical conditions, p > .89 in the atypical conditions). 
Other measures. The same 2 × 2 ANOVA on flight quality, typical taxes 
surcharge, and surcharge benefit revealed only a marginal effect of price presentation 
on surcharge benefit (F(1, 197) = 2.77, p < .10, η
2
p = .01), ruling them out as process 





partitioned conditions (M = 2.8) than in the all-inclusive conditions (M = 2.5). 
However, the lack of an interaction suggests that surcharge benefit cannot explain the 
effect on preference. Attention and surcharge fairness did not vary across the 
typicality conditions (ps > .11). 
Discussion 
Consistent with H9 and the meta-analysis, this study suggests that atypical 
surcharges attenuate the positive effect of partitioned pricing. Specifically, in the 
typical conditions, partitioning raised preference relative to all-inclusive presentation, 
but in the atypical conditions, the effect was not significant. Flight quality, typical 
taxes surcharge, surcharge benefit, attention, and surcharge fairness either did not 
show significant effects or had different patterns, ruling them out as process 
explanations. Although we did not offer a main-effect hypothesis for typicality, we 
found that preference was lower in the typical condition than in the atypical 
condition. At first glance, this appears surprising because atypicality might be 
expected to raise attention to a surcharge and to decrease rather than increase 
preference. One possibility is that it might be more difficult to process four 
partitioned airline prices (the typical condition) than it is to process four all-inclusive 
airline prices (the atypical condition) due to more information for the partitioned 
prices. This difficulty might reduce fluency and liking (Schwarz 2004) for any airline 
prices, resulting in the observed pattern; however, we were unable to test this because 
we did not have measures for fluency. 
Although we replicated the meta-analytic effect of typicality, there was no 





another study to check the effect of typicality on eye-tracked attention to the 
surcharge. 
Experiment 2: The Effect of Typicality on Attention to the Surcharge 
Participants and Procedure 
One hundred and twenty-nine participants were randomly assigned to the 
conditions of a 2 (price presentation: all-inclusive, partitioned) × 2 (typicality: typical, 
atypical) between-subjects ANOVA, and sat in front of a computer screen that had a 
Tobii X60 eye-tracker attached that was capable of recording which part of the 
computer screen they were looking at. Each participant saw two purchase scenarios 
that were from the same experimental condition: an airline scenario and a concert 
scenario. The airline scenario was similar to the scenario in Experiment 1, and 
typicality was cleanly manipulated, but there were no significant results, so we do not 
report this study in greater detail. 
For the concert scenario, participants looked at the first computer screen and, 
similar to the scenario in Experiment 1, they saw the scenario description and four 
reference prices and, on the next computer screen, they saw the target price. The focal 
component was a ticket and the partitioned component was a service charge. The 
reference tickets had total prices ranging from $94.67 to $96.67 and the base price 
and service charge for the partitioned reference prices ranged from $84.88 to $88.88 
and $7.79 to $9.79 respectively. The total price for the target ticket was $95.67 and 
the base price and service charge in the partitioned condition were $86.88 and $8.79 
respectively. Then, participants responded to a paper questionnaire with measures of 





surcharge favorability (partitioned only), surcharge fairness (partitioned only), a 
typicality manipulation check, and a control measure for concert quality. Finally, 
participants responded to measures of the expected typical surcharge and the 
perceived benefit for both scenarios. 
Areas of Interest (AoIs) were defined for the screen with the partitioned target 
prices as a rectangular box surrounding the surcharge. Each box had a buffer of 60 
pixels in all four directions in order to allow for measurement error. The eye-tracking 
DVs were Gaze Duration (Pieters and Wedel 2007) and Fixation Count (Henderson, 
Weeks, and Hollingworth 1999), defined respectively as the total time period and the 
number of times that the eye focuses at a particular position on the screen. These DVs 
measure the attention that participants paid to the AoIs, and they were computed only 
in the partitioned conditions as the corresponding text was absent in the all-inclusive 
conditions. Our prediction was that participants would pay more attention to the 
surcharge in the atypical condition. 
Results 
All data were analyzed at one shot after data collection stopped. Degrees of 
freedom vary across some of the analyses due to missing responses. 
The results of a 2 (price presentation: all-inclusive, partitioned) × 2 (typicality: 
typical, atypical) ANOVA on the concert scenario typicality manipulation check 
measure revealed only a main effect of typicality (F(1, 117) = 61.11, p < .001), 
indicating a successful manipulation (Ms = 5.9 vs. 3.3). The same 2 × 2 ANOVA 
analysis on purchase intention, offer evaluation, a combined preference index, flight 





However, a two-level (typicality: typical, atypical) one-way ANOVAs 
revealed (marginally) significant effects on gaze duration (F(1, 59) = 3.58, p = .06), 
fixation count (F(1, 59) = 4.40, p = .04), and surcharge favorability (F(1, 59) = 5.08, p 
= .03). Consistent with our prediction, more attention was paid to the AoI in the 
atypical condition than in the typical condition (Mgaze duration = 2.1 vs. 1.1 seconds and 
Mfixation count = 20.2 vs. 13.0). Although we only had a prediction about attention to the 
surcharge, we also computed eye-tracking DVs for the base price and found similar 
results as attention to the surcharge: more attention was paid to the base price in the 
atypical condition than in the typical condition (F(1, 59) = 9.21, p = .004 for gaze 
duration and F(1, 59) = 7.59, p = .008 for fixation count; Mgaze duration = 4.0 vs. 2.1 
seconds and Mfixation count = 37.4 vs. 20.5), perhaps because the atypical surcharge led 
participants to process not just the surcharge but also all other pricing information in 
greater detail. Surcharge favorability was rated lower in the atypical condition (M = 
3.4) than in the typical condition (M = 4.3), suggesting that participants reacted less 
favorably to the atypical surcharge. 
Discussion 
These results provide some insight into the differential effects of typical vs. 
atypical surcharges. However, as these differences did not manifest themselves on the 
downstream preference DVs, we are unable to draw firmer conclusions about the 
mediating role of attention in the effect of typical vs. atypical surcharges on 
preference. The lack of effects on the downstream DVs might be because the eye-
tracking portion of the study resulted in more noisy downstream measures 





Additionally, there were no effects in the airline scenario even though Experiment 1 
found effects on preference so, in order to explore this mechanism further, we plan to 
run another Web-based study with the concert scenario, but without any eye-tracking, 
to test the effects on downstream DVs in a cleaner experimental setup. 
General Discussion 
Partitioned pricing research initially focused on recall biases due to 
incomplete processing of surcharges, making partitioned prices seem more attractive 
to consumers (Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson 1998). More recent research has 
shown both positive and negative effects of price partitioning on demand, suggesting 
that moderators play an important role. In this paper, we theoretically classify 
moderators of partitioned pricing based on the source of their impact: presentational, 
evaluative, or attentional and then use meta-analysis to quantitatively summarize 17 
years of partitioned pricing research. We also report two experimental studies that 
examine typicality of partitioning the surcharge, one of the moderators that was 
shown to be significant in the meta-analysis, focusing on its moderating effect on 
demand and the role of attention. 
Contributions 
Our first contribution is to theoretically classify moderators of partitioned 
pricing based on the source of their impact: presentational, evaluative, or attentional. 
Our second contribution is to meta-analyze the partitioned pricing literature. 
Although there is one working paper reviewing research on price partitioning 





of the meta-analysis revealed a non-significant average effect size of .08 for 
partitioned pricing, suggesting that the main effect of partitioning is likely to be 
moderated by other factors. Consistent with this interpretation, the results of the meta-
analysis provided evidence that the effect of partitioned pricing is moderated by 
surcharge benefit and typicality of partitioning. We also ran various robustness 
checks and the results were generally robust across these checks. Price level and 
presence of the total price were marginally significant in the meta-analysis, but less 
robust, suggesting that these moderators might also have a role to play, although more 
research is needed to draw firm conclusions. 
Our third contribution is to introduce the typicality construct to partitioned 
pricing research. We define the typicality of partitioning as the degree to which 
partitioning a surcharge is representative of the norm for a particular category. 
Convergent results from the meta-analysis and Experiment 1 show that typicality 
moderates the effect of partitioned pricing. The meta-analysis showed that typical 
surcharges increase the effect of partitioning relative to atypical surcharges, and 
Experiment 1 showed a positive effect of partitioning for a typical surcharge but no 
effect for an atypical surcharge. Although the meta-analysis and Experiment 1 
showed a replicable effect of typicality and demonstrated that the effect was due to a 
positive effect of partitioning for typical surcharges and a null effect for atypical 
surcharges, the underlying process was not tested. One mechanism that may explain 
this effect is attention: surcharges that are atypical may attract more attention from 
consumers, leading to downstream effects on evaluations. In order to examine the 





Experiment 2, which provided some evidence for attention to surcharges being higher 
for atypical surcharges than for typical surcharges. 
Implications and Conclusion 
From a theoretical perspective, in addition to typicality of partitioning, the 
meta-analysis also identified surcharge benefit, price level, and presence of the total 
price as moderators of the effect of partitioned pricing. The influence of surcharge 
benefit is consistent with past research. For example, Bertini and Wathieu (2008) 
found more favorable evaluations for partitioned prices for a four-hour plus flight 
when the surcharge was for six movie channels and a full-service meal, but less 
favorable evaluations when the surcharge was for one episode of a sitcom and 
refreshments. The effect of presence of the total price is also consistent with prior 
research (Hamilton and Srivastava 2008) suggesting that explicitly providing the total 
price will attenuate the effect of price recall biases because anchoring and insufficient 
adjustment will be less likely to occur. Finally, consistent with Roggeveen, Xia, and 
Monroe (2006) and with Chatterjee (2010), price level had a positive impact on the 
effect of partitioned pricing on demand. 
In addition to these theoretical implications, the proposed research offers 
implications for business practitioners. Given resource constraints, marketers must 
prioritize their surcharge decisions; the coefficient magnitudes and significance levels 
in our results suggest that managers should first focus on high typicality of 
partitioning, followed by high surcharge benefit, total price absence, and high price 
levels. Also, as mentioned in the introduction of this paper, articles in the popular 





surcharges in the hope of improving profits. Our research suggests that for such 
atypical surcharges, the decision of whether to present partitioned or all-inclusive 
prices does not appear to matter much for demand. On the other hand, if marketers 
continue to use more typical surcharges, our results suggest that they might be better 
served by using a partitioned price presentation format. At the same time, if 
surcharges are perceived as low benefit, this may lead to even lower demand, thereby 
negating any potential gains for marketers. Against this backdrop, we note recent 
campaigns against partitioning prices, such as Southwest’s “No bag fees” campaign. 
Therefore, marketers who are contemplating partitioning prices should also consider 
the consumer’s initial commitment to purchasing, whether competitors partition out 
the component, and how consumers feel about paying separately for the components 
(Hamilton, Srivastava, and Abraham 2010). 
From a policy perspective, when surcharges are perceived to be unfair to 
consumers, government regulators may scrutinize their use. For example, the U. S. 
Federal Trade Commission recently organized a conference on “drip pricing” 
practices, which include partitioned pricing as well as other practices by which firms 
reveal surcharges in a sequential manner (U. S. Federal Trade Commission 2012). To 
protect consumers against “drip” pricing practices, regulatory watchdog agencies 
could insist that, if marketers choose to use partitioned prices, all the surcharges are 
displayed explicitly and early so that consumers know exactly what fees they will 
have to pay. Although it might not always be possible to regulate the specific 
surcharges that marketers partition out of prices, industry associations concerned 





member marketers should charge, they can ensure that members do not hurt 
themselves by charging fees that might lead to lower demand and counteract any 
increase in profits due to the fees themselves. 
In conclusion, we hope that this paper will spur further research examining 
consumers’ responses to partitioned pricing. For example, based on the potential role 
of attention in explaining the effects of SM and typicality, additional research might 
use eye-tracking experiments to measure physiological attention rather than 
traditional self-report measures. We hope that such follow-up research will further 
improve our understanding of consumers’ responses to surcharges and provide more 





Chapter 3: Attention! The Relative Influence of Base Price 
Anchoring and Surcharge Salience on Consumer Preference for 
Partitioned Prices 
 
Consider different pricing strategies of some sellers on eBay, all selling 
Pokemon charizard trading cards that were sold between February 27, 2015 and 
March 03, 2015 with a total price (winning bid plus shipping surcharge) ranging from 
$10.32 to $12.04. One seller (allansindy) listed a shipping surcharge of $0.95 and had 
a winning bid of $9.98 (shipping was approximately 10% of the winning bid or had 
an RSM of 10%) whereas another (brooks106) listed a shipping surcharge of $2.32 
and had a winning bid of $8 (30% RSM). A third seller (cindy_lou) listed a shipping 
surcharge of $5.54 and had a winning bid of $6.50 (85% RSM). 
Why do we observe these differences in pricing formats across sellers? 
Sellers’ beliefs about consumers’ reactions to surcharges must vary or they would not 
use different pricing formats. Prior research suggests that surcharges may influence 
consumer evaluations of offers in multiple ways. One stream of literature, starting 
with early research on partitioned pricing (Kim 2006; Lee and Han 2002; Morwitz, 
Greenleaf, and Johnson 1998), suggests that consumers incompletely process 
surcharges, thereby underestimating the total prices that they use in purchase 
decisions. Morwitz and colleagues (1998) proposed an anchoring-and-insufficient-
adjustment mechanism for this incomplete processing: consumers anchor on base 






For a given total price (the sum of the base price and the surcharge), as the 
ASM increases, the base price will decrease, resulting in a lower anchor when 
consumers try to recall the total price. Therefore, “base price anchoring” suggests 
lower total price estimates and higher purchase intentions as SM increases. Another 
stream of literature, based on psychophysics (Kamen and Tomen 1971; Monroe 
1971), suggests a countervailing influence: as the SM increases, consumers will be 
more likely to notice and attend to a surcharge due to increased “surcharge salience.” 
As attention to a surcharge increases, consumers will be more likely to process the 
surcharge, suggesting that as SM increases, consumers more accurately recall 
surcharges and total prices. 
Going back to our initial observations of sellers on eBay with low (10% 
RSM), moderate (30% RSM), and high (85% RSM) shipping surcharges, the base 
price anchoring account suggests that, as the SM increases, consumers are likely to 
anchor on the lower base price when they attempt to recall the total price. Prior 
literature on anchoring suggests that the magnitude of the adjusted outcome will be 
driven by the initial anchor (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), predicting that purchase 
intentions will be highest for offer 3 (85% RSM), followed by offer 2 (30% RSM), 
and then offer 1 (10% RSM). 
However, the surcharge salience account suggests that consumers are more 
likely to attend to and process all pricing information as the SM increases, implying 
increased attention to the surcharge, increased recalled total prices, and decreased 
purchase intentions as the SM increases. Thus, we should observe the opposite pattern 
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A priori, it is not clear which prediction is more accurate and under which 
conditions, suggesting the need for a deeper examination into these influences. With 
this motivation in mind, our problem statement is as follows: we examine the effect 
of SM on consumer preferences and attention to the surcharge, and attempt to identify 
conditions in which the relationship between SM and preference is positive vs. 
negative. 
The intended contributions of this essay are as follows. First, by focusing on 
the effect of SM, we develop predictions that take into account the opposing 
influences of base price anchoring and surcharge salience. This allows for a more 
complete investigation of the effects of surcharges on preference. We also attempt to 
identify conditions under which each of these influences will dominate. Second, 





Hamilton and Srivastava 2008) have investigated surcharge salience, there do not 
appear to be any direct tests for the role of attention in surcharge processing. We 
attempt to provide evidence for this role of attention in surcharge processing. We use 
behavioral experiments to test for effects on preference, and we examine the role of 
attention by using an eye-tracking experiment. We also attempt to provide external 
validity for our findings by analyzing eBay data. Figure 3 depicts the conceptual 







In the next section, we lay out the relevant theoretical foundation for our 





cases for the base price anchoring account and the surcharge salience account as well 
as the effects on attention, along with accompanying hypotheses. We then present 
results from three studies that we ran to test our hypotheses. We end with a summary 
of the proposed research and implications. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Partitioned Pricing and Absolute vs. Relative Magnitudes 
The principle of descriptive invariance (Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic 1988) 
suggests that preferences should not vary based on the format in which stimuli are 
presented. However, Morwitz and colleagues (1998) showed that this is not always 
true because partitioned prices, which present the total price split into a base price and 
a surcharge, increase demand relative to non-partitioned prices (holding the total price 
constant). These authors provide evidence for a price recall bias: consumers who saw 
partitioned prices were more likely to ignore surcharges and to recall lower total 
prices than those who observed non-partitioned prices. The mechanism suggested by 
Morwitz and colleagues was that consumers anchor (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) 
on the base price, which is encoded in memory. In contrast, the surcharge is not 
completely processed so it is not accurately encoded in memory. 
When consumers try to recall the price of a product at the time of evaluative 
judgments, they are usually able to recall the encoded base price because they 
anchored on it earlier. However, because they do not completely process the 
surcharge information, they do not accurately encode it, and they are less likely to 
accurately recall it (Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson 1998). Thus, consumers engage 





to account for the surcharge information. Such adjustments are usually insufficient, 
leading to a lower recalled total price than with non-partitioned prices. This price 
recall bias leads to higher demand, which subsequent research has validated (Kim 
2006; Lee and Han 2002). 
In the context of prices, Weber’s Law suggests that consumers are more 
sensitive to the same absolute change in the price of a less expensive component than 
in the price of a more expensive component (Monroe 1971). This is because the same 
absolute change has a greater relative magnitude for a less expensive component, 
indicating that consumers process changes in relative rather than absolute terms. This 
suggests that the effect of surcharges can be studied relative to the base price rather 
than in absolute terms. However, we do not focus on the absolute versus relative 
distinction because our stimuli use positively correlated absolute and relative SM. 
Base Price Anchoring 
The mechanism proposed by Morwitz and colleagues (1998) suggests that 
consumers are in a default mode of bottom-up or stimulus-driven information 
processing (Berlyne 1960; Kahneman 1973; Park and Smith 1989), which is driven 
by the involuntary attention that is paid to the characteristics of stimuli (as opposed to 
top-down or goal-driven information processing with the aim of processing specific 
stimuli or portions of stimuli). In such a bottom-up mode, consumers attend to and 
anchor on the base price and then encode it, but they pay less attention to the less 
salient surcharge. This leads to incomplete processing of the surcharge, so it is not 





Yadav (1994) showed that, in transactions involving bundles, consumers 
anchor on a focal component, usually the more expensive one. Consistent with base 
price anchoring, other things being equal, a higher SM (implying a lower base price) 
should lead to a greater price recall bias and higher purchase intentions. This is 
consistent with past research (Cheema 2008; Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson 1998), 
suggesting that consumers are not paying complete attention to the surcharge (for 
moderate- and high-reputation eBay sellers in the case of Cheema’s research), and 
research showing that higher shipping fees lead to higher revenue on eBay (Hossain 
and Morgan 2006). Therefore, base price anchoring predicts lower base price anchors 
as a function of SM, leading to lower recalled prices and the following hypothesis: 
H1a: Higher SMs lead to greater preference than lower SMs. 
Surcharge Salience 
Another stream of research has focused on how partitioning increases the 
salience of and the attention paid to surcharges and secondary components. 
Chakravarti and colleagues (2002) found that partitioning increased the salience of 
benefits associated with a partitioned component. Subsequent evaluations were then 
based on the relative levels of benefit offered by various partitioned components. 
Bertini and Wathieu (2008) also found evidence for the role of attention to secondary 
benefits derived from a transaction (the benefits derived from the non-focal 
components) as a consequence of partitioned pricing and as a driver of preference. 
The surcharge salience account suggests that, as SM increases, consumers will 
be more likely to notice and pay attention to surcharges, leading to higher recalled 





purchase intentions (Campbell 1999; Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004). Consistent with 
this account, prior research has shown that higher SM increases perceived 
expensiveness (Wang and Lynn 2007), and reduces perceived value (Wang and Lynn 
2007; Xia and Monroe 2004), willingness to pay (WTP; Burman and Biswas 2007) 
and likelihood of buying (Burman and Biswas 2007; Chatterjee 2010; Cheema 2008), 
leading to the following competing hypothesis for H1a. We note that this is not a new 
hypothesis, but we formally state the hypothesis in order to test the competing 
predictions offered by the base price anchoring account and the surcharge salience 
account. 
H1b: Higher SMs lead to lower preference than lower SMs. 
At the same time, this stream of research has not investigated the possibility of 
differential attention due to different SMs. Therefore, we propose the following 
hypothesis about the effect of SM on attention: 
H2: Higher SMs will increase attention to the surcharge relative to lower 
SMs. 
We have proposed competing hypotheses about the effects of base price 
anchoring and the effects of surcharge salience. It is also possible that these effects 
will occur simultaneously, balancing one another at some or all levels of SM, and 
leading to neither a completely upward-sloping nor a completely downward-sloping 
curve, but to an inverted U-shaped curve. Our studies are designed to test this 
possibility. Based on the dissertation proposal, we have one additional hypothesis 





this essay; however, we include this theory and hypothesis in Appendix 3 and the 
results from multiple studies that were run to test the hypothesis in Appendix 4. 
Overview of Methodology to be Employed 
To investigate the hypotheses, we describe three studies. We begin with Study 
1, an empirical analysis of eBay auction data to examine the effect of SM on 
preferences in an externally valid context. We follow that with Study 2, a behavioral 
experiment to investigate the relationship between SM and preference in a more 
controlled setting, and Study 3, an eye-tracking experiment that studies the effect of 
SM on preference and attention. Given prior research suggesting that some consumers 
react negatively to certain charges such as shipping (Hamilton and Srivastava 2008; 
Schindler, Morrin, and Bechwati 2005), we use a variety of surcharges in Study 3 to 
demonstrate greater robustness for our proposed effects. In the next sections, we 
describe the methodology and the results of the analyses for our studies. In line with 
recent practices (LeBel et al. 2013; Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn 2012), we 
report all data exclusions, stopping rules, measures, covariates, manipulations, and 
sample size determinations for our studies. 
Study 1: Analysis of eBay Data 
Field studies on partitioned pricing have used data from Internet shopping 
bots (Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001), Korean auction Web-sites (Chan, Kadiyali, and 
Park 2007), and eBay (Cheema 2008). We focus on eBay data because eBay is the 
most ubiquitous Internet auction Web-site, with “more than ten times the revenue of 





provides WTP data, which can be used to empirically quantify the effect of 
surcharges in a field setting. Moreover, eBay provides publicly available access to 
data from auctions for a period of a little over two weeks after an auction has ended 
(Clark and Ward 2008). 
One question is whether auction data from Web-sites such as eBay allows for 
an accurate representation of WTP. Shmueli and Jank (2005) provide a summary of 
the auction process on eBay, which usually follows a second-price auction process 
with automatic proxy-bidding increases. Accordingly, the winning bid is actually not 
the WTP for the winning bidder, but a marginal amount higher than the WTP of the 
second-highest bidder. However, in line with prior research (Cheema 2008; Clark and 
Ward 2008; Hossain and Morgan 2006), this winning bid amount has been used as an 
acceptable proxy for WTP, and we propose to use eBay auction data in the same 
manner. 
Sellers on eBay have a choice of charging a shipping fee for products that they 
sell. Therefore, some sellers prefer to charge a separate shipping fee, leading to a 
partitioned price, with a base price winning bid for the auctioned item and the 
surcharge for the shipping fee. Therefore, overall WTP is the sum of winning bid and 
the surcharge. The shipping fee (if present) is usually specified in a separate field 
below the item details such as item name and item condition (new, used, etc.), and the 
bidding details (time left, bid history, and current bid) as well as the field for entering 
one’s bid. Data is also available on the feedback score for each seller, which is an 





shown the role of seller reputation (Bradlow and Park 2007; Carlson and Weathers 
2008; Cheema 2008). 
Procedure 
Sample size was determined by the number of completed auctions with 
publicly available information over three non-overlapping data-collection periods. 
Data recording in each period stopped after all data entry, leading to 313 auctions. We 
selected items that have been used in past research and other categories in which both 
partitioned and non-partitioned prices are frequently observed. We used the category 
of blu-ray movie trilogies, specifically focusing on the Lord of the Rings trilogy, 
which was one of the trilogies investigated by Cheema (2008). We also used the 
category of Pokemon charizard trading cards that was examined by Clark and Ward 
(2008). Additionally, we used 16GB iPod nanos and JDM Super White 9006/HB4 
Halogen Headlight Light Bulbs based on a search of possible product categories with 
a mix of partitioned and non-partitioned pricing formats. However, to test our 
hypotheses, we required data from only the partitioned formats, leading to data from a 
total of 243 auctions that still provided greater generalizability than prior research 
(Cheema 2008; Hossain and Morgan 2006), which looked at one and two product 
categories respectively. 
Overall WTP was computed as the sum of winning bid and shipping fee for 
each auction. Past research has suggested some important control variables when 
studying auctions, so we included them too in our analysis to provide a more holistic 
perspective than prior research. Seller feedback score was used to control for any 





Cheema 2008) that might be driving some of the differences in WTP across the 
various auctions that data is available for. We also included opening bid (Hossain and 
Morgan 2006), duration of auction (Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007), weekday vs. 
weekend closing (Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007), and number of bids (Hossain and 
Morgan 2006). In order to test H1a, H1b, and the joint influence of base price 
anchoring and surcharge salience, we regressed WTP on shipping fee magnitude and 
squared shipping fee magnitude, with the previously mentioned control variables as 
covariates along with category dummy variables for Pokemon card, halogen light, 
and iPod nano. All independent variables were mean-centered before analysis. 
Results 
Data were analyzed after each data-collection period and then altogether. 
Table 8 contains the results for the coefficients of shipping fee magnitude and 
















STUDY 1: OVERALL AND CATEGORY-LEVEL ANALYSES 











Overall 243 44% 1.58*** -.01 
Blu-ray trilogy 39 26% 1.68** -.02* 
iPod nano 59 7% -.39 .05 
Halogen light 67 89% 
Excluded 
due to low 
variance 
-1.56 
Pokemon card 78 41% 2.29** -.02 
 
The results of the regression analysis revealed a significant overall model 
(R
2
adj = .93, p < .001), and the category dummy variable coefficients revealed 
significant category-level differences in WTP relative to the baseline category of the 
blu-ray trilogy (βiPod = 65.80; t(311) = 17.23, p < .001; βhalogen light = -26.16; t(311) = -
8.11, p < .001; βPokemon card = -20.29; t(311) = -7.67, p < .001). Importantly, consistent 
with H1a and the base price anchoring account, but inconsistent with H1b and the 
surcharge salience account, the coefficient for shipping fee magnitude was positive (β 
= 1.58; t(311) = 3.89, p < .001), indicating that, for every $1 increase in shipping fee, 
WTP increases by $1.58, which is also consistent with the findings of Cheema (2008) 
and Hossain and Morgan (2006). Although the coefficient for squared shipping fee 
was negative, it was not significant (p = .16), indicating lack of support for the joint 
influence of base price anchoring and surcharge salience. 
Control variables. Of the control variables, there was a positive relationship 





consistent with theorizing by Hossain and Morgan (2006). Finally, there was a 
positive relationship (β = .25; t(311) = 5.63, p < .001) between opening bid and total 
price, which is inconsistent with prior research showing that lower opening bids 
increase revenue (Hossain and Morgan 2006). 
Robustness check. In an attempt to check the robustness of our findings in 
each of the individual product categories, we ran similar regressions (but without the 
dummy variables for product category) for the auctions within each product category. 
The results of these analyses vary across category, with only the blu-ray trilogy and 
the Pokemon card having a significant positive coefficient for shipping fee magnitude 
(β = 1.68; t(39) = 3.33, p = .002 and β = 2.29; t(76) = 2.68, p = .009), indicating that, 
for every $1 increase in shipping fee, WTP increases by $1.68 and $2.29 respectively, 
which is consistent with H1a and results of the analysis on all product categories, but 
not with H1b. The blu-ray trilogy analysis also revealed a significant negative 
coefficient for squared shipping fee (β = -.02; t(39) = -2.21, p =.04), indicating the 
joint influence of base price anchoring and surcharge salience. None of the other 
analyses yielded significant coefficients for shipping fee magnitude or squared 
shipping fee magnitude. 
Discussion 
Consistent with H1a and the base price anchoring account, Study 1 found a 
positive effect of shipping fee on WTP. Extant literature has generally focused on a 
single product category to study the effect of SM, but we used eBay auction data from 
four categories with different price levels to demonstrate that shipping fee affects 





Although we did not find support for the joint influence of base price anchoring and 
surcharge salience in the overall analysis, we found support for their dual influences 
in a category-level analysis of the blu-ray trilogy. 
One reason why this might be is because the average RSM in this category 
was 26%, allowing for a range of RSM values across the spectrum and providing 
more scope for any relationships to manifest themselves as compared to the other 
categories with average RSM values at the low end (7% for iPod, suggesting a right-
truncated range of values) or at the high end (89% for halogen light and 41% for 
Pokemon card, suggesting a left-truncated range of values). Support for the joint 
influences of base price anchoring and surcharge salience over a range of RSM values 
suggests that H1a is true for some range of the data, followed by an inflection point, 
and then H1b is true for the subsequent range of the data. Therefore, we keep in mind 
the RSM range in Study 2 as we investigate this relationship deeper and attempt to 
identify conditions under which base price anchoring and surcharge salience 
dominate as the underlying mechanisms. 
The positive effect of shipping fee magnitude is consistent with the work of 
Cheema (2008), who found a positive effect of shipping fee magnitude on WTP for 
moderate- and high-reputation eBay sellers, ostensibly because eBay buyers 
discounted their WTP to account for surcharges from low-reputation sellers, but not 
from moderate- and high-reputation sellers. This is also consistent with the findings 
of Hossain and Morgan (2006), who found that higher shipping fees led to higher 
revenue on eBay, and speculated that the resulting lower opening bids resulted in 





the positive effect of shipping fee on WTP suggests that buyers might be 
incompletely adjusting for the surcharge. At the same time, it is possible that the 
positive effect of shipping fee on WTP might be driven by quality inferences about 
the efficacy of the shipping service, but we do not have data on this, so we examine 
this potential explanation further by including a control measure in Study 2. 
Of the control variables, the positive relationship between opening bid and 
total price was inconsistent with the work of Hossain and Morgan (2006), which 
showed that lower opening bids increase revenue. However, a confound in their study 
is that it is unclear whether their findings were due to opening bid or shipping 
surcharge because these two values always summed up to the auction reserve price of 
$8, leading to a consistent negative correlation. 
Additionally, although we found evidence for H1a, it is important to note that 
the only other papers (Cheema 2008; Hossain and Morgan 2006) to have found a 
positive effect of SM on preference also use eBay auction data. This suggests that 
there might be something unique about the eBay setting that makes surcharges less 
salient, leading to a less dominant influence of the surcharge salience mechanism and 
a more dominant influence of the base price anchoring mechanism. However, we are 
unable to examine this issue further as we don’t have measures of attention. 
Therefore, in Study 2, we begin studying the role of attention in surcharge processing 
by using a self-reported measure, and we attempt to rule out alternative explanations 
such as the one based on expected efficacy of the shipping service. 
Finally, although we found evidence for H1a, the results varied by category. 





of factors such as market price, average RSM, and the nature of the category (e.g., 
hedonic vs. utilitarian). Therefore, in Study 2, we also eliminate the role of category-
level differences by using a single product category. 
Study 2: Exploration of Base Price Anchoring versus Surcharge Salience 
Participants and Procedure 
Two hundred and fourteen participants were randomly assigned to the 
conditions of an eight-level (SM: 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, and 40%) 
between-subjects experimental design. We used eight SM levels in order to provide a 
wide range of SM for the dual influences of base price anchoring and surcharge 
salience to occur, similar to the SM range for the blu-ray trilogy in Study 1. Data 
collection was undertaken in two phases. In the first phase, 169 participants (the 
number of students in one week of research sessions, which was predetermined as the 
time-frame for data collection) were randomly assigned to all eight conditions and 
data collection stopped at the end of the week. Preliminary analyses led to the 
identification of four conditions (5%, 15%, 25%, and 35%) that were most likely to 
demonstrate the joint influences of base price anchoring and surcharge salience. 
Therefore, in the second phase, 45 participants (the number of students in one day of 
research sessions, which was predetermined as the time-frame for additional 
participants) were randomly assigned to these four conditions to increase the sample 
size, and data collection stopped at the end of the day. However, our final analyses 
take into account all eight conditions despite the uneven cell sizes. 
Participants were asked to imagine that they were making an online purchase 





Participants then saw a partitioned price presentation with a base price for the book 
and a surcharge for standard shipping such that the total price always summed to 




STUDY 2: BASE PRICE AND SURCHARGE VALUES 
SM 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 
Base price $55.07 $52.56 $50.28 $48.14 $46.25 $44.48 $42.83 $41.30 
Surcharge $2.75 $5.26 $7.54 $9.64 $11.56 $13.34 $14.99 $16.52 
 
Next, participants responded to measures of purchase intention, offer 
evaluation, attitude towards the seller, clarity of pricing information, recalled total 
price, details of how total price was recalled, confidence in recalled total price, 
recalled surcharge, confidence in recalled surcharge, attention to the surcharge, 
positive and negative mood, surcharge fairness, perceived surcharge magnitude, 
shipping quality, typicality of a single price, typicality of a partitioning, and 
experience purchasing books online. As the second offer evaluation item was reverse-
coded, it did not correlate well with the other two items (r = -.21 and -.09 vs. .77 
between the first and third items) and reduced overall scale reliability. Therefore, we 
averaged only the first and third items to also create a two-item offer evaluation scale 








STUDY 2: DETAILS OF DEPENDENT MEASURES 
Measure 
Purchase intention (r = .93) 
How likely are you to purchase the book from this seller? (1 = very unlikely; 7 = very likely) 
How probable is it that you will purchase the book from this seller? (1 = very improbable; 7 = 
very probable) 
Offer evaluation (r = .77) 
The overall deal is: (1 = not at all attractive/very unfair; 7 = very attractive/very fair) 
Not included in scale – The overall deal is: (1 = very desirable; 7 = very undesirable) 
Attitude towards the seller (α = .89) 
The seller is trustworthy/reliable/honest/transparent about providing information. (1 = strongly 
disagree; 7 = strongly agree) 
Clarity of pricing information (r = .64) 
The pricing information is trustworthy/transparent. (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) 
Recalled total price 
Please recall from memory the exact total price for the book in dollars and cents (inclusive of 
all charges). 
Recall details 
Please use a couple of lines to provide some details about how you recalled the total price for 
the book. 
Recalled total price confidence 
How confident are you about the total price you recalled for the book? (1 = not at all 
confident; 7 = very confident) 
Recalled surcharge 
Please recall the exact price for the shipping surcharge (in dollars and cents). 
Recalled surcharge confidence 
How confident are you about the price you recalled for the shipping surcharge? (1 = not at all 
confident; 7 = very confident) 
Attention to surcharge 
How much attention did you pay to the shipping surcharge when you evaluated the overall 
offer? (1 = very little attention; 7 = a lot of attention) 
Positive mood 
Please indicate to what extent you currently feel the following emotions: 
interested/proud/attentive. (1 = very slightly or not at all; 2 = a little; 3 = moderately; 4 = 
quite a bit; 5 = extremely) 
Negative mood 
Please indicate to what extent you currently feel the following emotions: upset/hostile/irritable. 
(1 = very slightly or not at all; 2 = a little; 3 = moderately; 4 = quite a bit; 5 = extremely) 
Surcharge fairness (r = .96) 
Please rate the fairness of the price for the shipping surcharge/How fair was the price for the 
shipping surcharge? (1 = very unfair; 7 = very fair) 






How would you rate the price for the shipping surcharge/Please rate the magnitude of the price 
for the shipping surcharge? (1 = very low; 4 = moderate; 7 = very high) 
Shipping quality 
In your opinion, the quality of service for the shipping is likely to be: (1 = very low; 7 = very 
high) 
Typicality of a single price 
In your opinion, how typical is it that Amazon.com’s online marketplace quotes a single price 
that includes a shipping surcharge? (1 = not at all typical; 7 = very typical) 
Typicality of partitioning 
In your opinion, how typical is it that the price of a book on Amazon.com’s online 
marketplace has a separate shipping surcharge? (1 = not at all typical; 7 = very typical) 
Experience purchasing books online 
How much experience do you have purchasing books online? (1 = no experience at all; 7 = a 
lot of experience) 
 
Examination of the data revealed the presence of a potential outlier that might 
be skewing the results: one of the participants recalled a total price of $155 in the 
35% SRM condition (the next highest recalled total price was only $68.3 as against 
the actual total price of $57.82). Therefore, we excluded this participant from our 
analyses. Due to other missing data, degrees of freedom vary across some measures. 















STUDY 2: MEANS OF DEPENDENT MEASURES 
Measure 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 
Purchase intention 3.65 3.90 4.06 3.15 3.22 3.90 2.83 2.73 
Offer evaluation (2-item) 3.38 3.45 3.92 2.90 2.73 3.75 2.78 2.36 
Seller trust 4.56 4.43 4.54 4.36 4.38 4.45 4.19 4.18 
Pricing clarity 5.41 5.15 5.52 5.10 5.03 5.50 5.19 5.11 
Recalled total price 
($57.82) 
$57.21 $57.43 $56.81 $55.84 $54.64 $56.94 $56.61 $55.91 
Confidence in recalled 
total price 
4.85 4.90 4.65 4.65 4.13 4.35 3.84 4.41 
Recalled shipping fee $2.72 $5.16 $6.97 $9.11 $11.47 $13.46 $14.46 $16.49 
Confidence in recalled 
shipping fee 
4.76 4.80 4.23 4.00 4.25 4.55 4.91 4.77 
Attention to surcharge 4.79 5.70 5.48 4.60 5.88 5.85 5.63 6.05 
Positive mood 6.91 7.40 7.03 6.90 6.78 6.60 5.59 5.32 
Negative mood 5.33 5.20 4.10 4.65 4.88 5.40 4.88 5.32 
Surcharge fairness 6.00 5.08 4.40 3.58 2.97 3.15 2.39 2.14 
Surcharge magnitude 3.35 4.30 4.71 4.68 5.16 5.23 4.88 6.02 
Quality of shipping 3.91 4.65 4.97 5.30 5.31 5.85 5.53 5.09 
Typically non-partitioned 
shipping fee 
3.18 3.90 3.58 3.70 3.59 3.35 4.06 3.27 
Typically partitioned 
shipping fee 
5.97 5.85 5.87 5.20 4.97 5.75 5.29 5.68 
Experience 4.73 5.75 5.13 4.50 3.94 5.20 4.25 5.00 
 
Results 
Manipulation checks. A one-way ANOVA on the recalled shipping surcharge 
revealed an effect of condition (F(7, 201) = 564.84, p < .001). A planned contrast that 
was run to test for a linear trend (-7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7) was positive and revealed a 





manipulation. A similar one-way ANOVA on the perceived magnitude of the 
shipping surcharge revealed an effect of condition (F(7, 201) = 10.02, p < .001). A 
planned contrast for the linear trend (-7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7) was positive and revealed a 
significant effect (F(1, 201) = 52.21, p < .001), providing further evidence of a 
successful manipulation. 
Purchase intention. A one-way ANOVA on purchase intention revealed an 
effect of condition (F(7, 201) = 2.77, p < .01). A planned contrast for the linear trend 
(-7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7) was negative and revealed a significant effect (F(1, 201) = 6.76, p 
< .05), providing support for H1b, but not for H1a. A planned quadratic contrast that 
was used to test for the joint influence base price anchoring and surcharge salience 
did not reveal a significant effect (p > .59). 
Offer evaluation. A one-way ANOVA on the two-item measure of 
participants’ offer evaluation revealed an effect of condition (F(7, 201) = 3.46, p < 
.01). A planned contrast for the linear trend (-7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7) was negative and 
revealed a significant effect (F(1, 201) = 11.50, p < .01), providing support for H1b, 
but not for H1a. The planned contrast that was used to test for the joint influence of 
base price anchoring and surcharge salience did not reveal a significant effect (p > 
.49). Using a preference measure that was created by averaging offer evaluation and 
purchase intention led to similar results as on the purchase intention and offer 
evaluation measures. 
Recalled total price. A one-way ANOVA on the recalled total price did not 
reveal a significant effect (p > .44), and planned contrasts for a linear trend (-7 -5 -3 -





not reveal any significant effects either (ps > .18). We return to this result in the 
discussion. 
Attention to the surcharge. A one-way ANOVA on participants’ self-reported 
measure of the attention that they paid to the surcharge revealed an effect of condition 
(F(7, 201) = 2.96, p < .01). Supportive of H2, the planned contrast for a linear trend (-
7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7) was positive and revealed a significant effect (F(1, 201) = 7.81, p < 
.01). 
Control measures. One-way ANOVAs on attitude towards the seller, clarity of 
pricing information, confidence, negative mood, and typicality of presenting a single 
price did not reveal significant effects (ps > .35), ruling these out as explanations for 
the observed effects. One-way ANOVAs on some of the other control measures 
revealed significant effects. The positive mood scale revealed an effect (F(7, 201) = 
2.21, p < .05) as did perceived fairness (F(7, 201) = 26.33, p < .001), perceived 
shipping quality (F(7, 201) = 5.40, p < .001), typicality of presenting a separate 
surcharge (F(7, 201) = 2.01, p < .06), and experience (F(7, 201) = 2.41, p < .05). 
Base price anchoring vs. surcharge salience. Based on a visual examination 
of the cell means, there appears to be a positive trend for purchase intention and offer 
evaluation in the 5% to 15% conditions, and a negative trend in the 30% to 40% 
conditions so, in order to more clearly identify conditions under which H1a might be 
true and conditions under which H1b might be true, we ran post hoc contrasts (-1 0 1 
0 0 1 0 -1) on both these measures. Both contrasts were significant (F(1, 206) = 8.92 
and 8.17, ps = .003 and .005), supporting the joint influence of base price anchoring 





To isolate these levels furthers, we excluded the 20% and 25% cells and then 
ran 2 (SM level: low, high i.e. RSM <= 15%, RSM >= 30%) × 3 (RSM: baseline, + 
5%, + 10%) ANOVAs on purchase intention and offer intention. Both ANOVAs 
revealed main effects of SM level (F(1, 155) = 4.14 and 7.93, ps = .04 and .006) and 
an interaction between SM level and RSM (F(1, 155) = 4.07 and 4.06, ps = .02 and 
.02). Purchase intention and offer evaluation were higher when SM level was low 
than when it was high (Ms = 3.61 vs. 2.97 and 3.87 vs. 3.14), and planned quadratic 
contrasts also revealed the joint influence of base price anchoring and surcharge 
salience (F(5, 155) = 2.80 and 3.77, ps = .02 and .003), suggesting that base price 
anchoring is the dominant mechanism at lower SM levels and that surcharge salience 
is the dominant mechanism at higher SM levels. 
Discussion 
The purpose of the current study was to attempt to replicate the findings of 
Study 1 with shipping surcharges, but in a more controlled, non-confounded, 
experimental setting. Although there was support for H1b on offer evaluation, there 
was no direct support for H1a, which appears inconsistent with the findings from 
Study 1. However, one way that both H1a and H1b both hold true is that base price 
anchoring is the dominant underlying mechanism for some range of the data, 
followed by an inflection point, and then surcharge salience is the dominant 
underlying mechanism for the subsequent range of the data, making H1a true for 
some regions of the relationship between SM and preference (at lower SM levels), 
and H1b true for other regions of the relationship between SM and preference (at 





Although there was no direct support for the dual influences of base price 
anchoring and surcharge salience, this could be because there is no positive linear 
trend in this data or because of insufficient power in the sample given some cell sizes 
were only around 20. This could also be due to the presence of the 20% and 25% SM 
conditions, which appear to have cell means that are dissonant with the trend 
demonstrated by the other cell means. To overcome this data limitation, we ran post 
hoc contrasts and 2 (SM) × 3 (RSM) ANOVAs on purchase intention and offer 
evaluation, and found support for the dual influences of base price anchoring and 
surcharge salience, suggesting that H1a is true at lower SM levels, and that H1b is 
true at higher SM levels. 
There was no effect on the price recall measure, which might be because 
consumers are unable to accurately recall prices that they implicitly use in decision-
making (Monroe and Lee 1999). Mediation tests by using Hayes’s (2012) PROCESS 
macro revealed that attention partially mediated the effect of SM on purchase 
intention, but not on offer evaluation. The effects of SM on purchase intention and 
offer evaluation were also partially mediated by positive mood and perceived 
fairness, but not by perceived shipping quality, typicality of presenting a separate 
surcharge, and experience. The multiple mediating paths might be because consumers 
are not very good at self-reporting their attention. To overcome this potential 
limitation, in Study 3, we focus on the effect of SM on attention by providing results 
from an eye-tracking study that reports physiological measures of attention. 
Based on a proposed study in the dissertation proposal, we also reran Study 2 





5% to 35% RSM. Additionally, we modified the scenario to be more relevant to 
undergraduate students (a limited-edition book with high-resolution photographs of 
the paintings that they would be studying in an art class), and we also modified all 
three measures for offer evaluation to not be reverse-coded. Linear contrasts were 
supportive of H1b (F(6, 248) = 2.86, 2.97, and 3.12 for purchase intention, offer 
evaluation, and preference; ps = .01, .008, and .006 respectively) and of H2 (F(6, 248) 
= 5.80 for self-reported attention to the surcharge, p < .001), but not of H1a. 
Additionally, a quadratic contrast (-1 0 1 0 1 0 -1) was not significant (p > .74, .91, 
and .92 for purchase intention, offer evaluation, and preference respectively), 
indicating lack of support for the joint influence of base price anchoring and 
surcharge salience. Therefore, we do not report this study in greater detail in this 
essay. The lack of evidence for H1a might be because undergraduate students reacted 
negatively to the shipping surcharge in this scenario, which is consistent with the 
phenomenon of shipping-charge skepticism (Schindler, Morrin, and Bechwati 2005). 
Therefore, we are rerunning this study with the same scenario, but with the secondary 
component being a CD-ROM containing analysis of the paintings rather than 
shipping. 
Study 3: Eye-Tracking Study 
In this study, we analyzed eye movements to test H2, which relates to the role 
of attention when surcharges are low vs. high. Eye movements are classified as 
saccades, which are movements of the eye from one position on the screen to the 
next, and fixations, during which time the eye is focused at a particular position on 





stimuli, wherein elements of a stimulus are projected onto the fovea for detailed 
processing (Pieters and Wedel 2007). Fixation count refers to the number of times the 
fovea is fixated on a stimulus element (Henderson, Weeks, and Hollingworth 1999), 
and this was our eye-tracking measure of attention. Fixation count can be calculated 
to include refixations as a single fixation, which reduces the divergence across 
conditions that might vary in terms of fixation count and which we used because it 
was a more conservative measure. 
Participants and Procedure 
This study used Tobii 1750 infrared eye-tracking equipment 
(www.Tobii.com). Sample size was predetermined as the number of participants who 
could do the study in two weeks of research sessions. One hundred and two 
participants (99% male, Mage = 20.3 years) were randomly assigned to the five 
conditions of a 2 (SM: low, high) × 2 (presence of total price: absent, present) + 1 
(control: non-partitioned price) between-subjects design that was fully crossed with 
product category (10 levels) as a within-subject factor. Although we did not 
hypothesize about the role of presence of total price, we included this factor to see if 
it had a role to play as suggested by prior research (e.g., Carlson and Weathers 2008) 
and by the meta-analysis. Additionally, although data were collected for the non-
partitioned condition as this was originally meant to be an exploratory study, the 
analyses of interest do not include these data as they are not relevant to the 
hypotheses. However, we report the means for the non-partitioned condition on the 
key dependent measures, and note that they were not significantly different from the 





Participants sat in front of a Tobii monitor with cameras embedded in its 
perimeter. The cameras tracked the position of participants’ eyes by measuring the 
position of the fovea multiple times every second. The task began with a calibration 
exercise to calibrate participants’ eyes, followed by instructions informing 
participants that they would be presented with product information and that they 
should go through the information presented as if they were considering purchasing 
the products. The computer screen then presented information about a purchase 
scenario for purchasing a book online. 
Participants navigated to the next screen by pressing the space bar on the 
keyboard. This screen contained pricing information about the book base price and 
the shipping surcharge, and participants had to navigate to the next screen by pressing 
the space bar on the keyboard. This screen then directed participants to the paper-
based questionnaire. 
As participants reviewed the stimuli on the screen, the Tobii monitor tracked 
their eye movements, allowing us to compute unobtrusive measures of attention such 
as fixation count, which allow us to track how much the fovea is fixated on a 
particular stimulus element. Figure 4 contains screenshots of the pricing information 















Total absent × Low SM         Total absent × High SM 
 






The paper-based questionnaire obtained ratings of participants’ evaluation of 
the offer on the screen and their purchase intentions, similar to the measures that were 
used in Study 2, but with each product category being referenced in the measures, 
with nine-point rather than seven-point scales, and without any reverse-coded items. 
The paper-based questionnaire then directed participants back to the computer screen. 
In a similar manner, participants were presented information about nine other 
purchase scenarios and provided responses for each product. The 10 within-subject 
product categories were: online book and shipping fee, flight ticket and in-flight 
entertainment, camera and battery, textbook and software, concert ticket and service 
charge, car bumper and installation fee, NFL game ticket and valet parking fee, pizza 
and delivery fee, hotel and housekeeping fee, and computer and Windows. 
In the low SM conditions, surcharge levels were selected so that, depending 
on the product category, RSM was between 3% and 12% and, in the high SM 
conditions, surcharge levels were selected so that RSM was between 20% and 75%. 
These levels were selected based on the results of Study 2, so that we would be able 
to test the positive effect of SM on attention and the negative effect of SM on 
preference, but also so that the surcharges were ecologically valid. All 10 product 
categories in a condition belonged to the same cell of our 2 × 2 + 1 experimental 
design. For example, participants in the low SM × total price absent condition saw 10 
purchase scenarios in which the SM was low and the total price was absent. For the 
ninth and tenth product categories (hotel and desktop computer), we also obtained 
participants’ estimates of the total price as recalled from memory; we did not obtain 





participants paying unnatural attention to the pricing information because they knew 
that they would be asked to recall it. After the tenth set of screens and paper-based 
ratings, participants rated on nine-point scales (for all 10 categories) the typicality of 
partitioning (how typical it was for the surcharge to be partitioned out of the total 
price) and familiarity with the prices for products in the category. 
Areas of Interest 
In the partitioned conditions, each price information screen had an Area of 
Interest (AoI): the surcharge. The eye-tracking data set was created by obtaining 
fixation count for the surcharge in each product category. For the purpose of 
obtaining the eye-tracking data, AoIs were defined by the smallest rectangle that 
could contain all the text associated with each surcharge plus a buffer displacement of 
50 pixels above and below the rectangle and 35 pixels to the left and right of the 
rectangle to account for potential sources of error in the eye-tracking equipment that 
relate to viewing angle inaccuracies of up to half a degree, leading to AoI height of 
134 pixels. 





STUDY 3: MEANS OF KEY DEPENDENT MEASURES 





Absent Present Absent Present 
SM Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Book shipping 4.1 4.2 4 4.5 4.1 4.4 5.3 4.4 5 5 2 2.7 2.1 2.8 
Flight entertainment 6.0 6.9 6.2 6.3 5.5 6.4 6.9 6 6.3 5.9 2.7 3.3 2.4 3.2 
Camera battery 7.1 6.1 5.6 6.5 6.6 7.6 6.9 6.2 7 7 2.2 2.2 1.8 2.3 
Textbook software 7.0 6.4 6.3 6.8 6.9 4.3 4.8 4.4 4.4 4.6 1.9 2.1 1.7 2.2 
Concert service 
charge 
3.4 4.6 3.6 4.9 4.2 4.5 5.5 4.2 5.4 4.5 1.5 1.9 1.3 2.8 
Bumper installation 7.9 7.9 7.7 7.5 7.6 7.4 7.1 7.1 7.2 7 1.7 2 1.9 2.6 
NFL game parking 7.3 6.6 6.5 7 6.6 7.4 7.2 6.6 7.3 6.5 1.9 2.5 2 2.8 
Pizza delivery 6.4 6.9 6.6 6.8 5.5 6.3 6.4 6.1 6.8 5.5 1.7 1.8 1.6 3.8 
Hotel housekeeping 5.7 6.5 4.9 4.8 5.4 5.1 5.4 4.6 4.5 4.7 1.7 2 1.8 3.1 







Purchase intention and offer evaluation. A 10 (category) × 2 (SM) × 2 
(presence of total price) mixed ANOVA on purchase intention revealed only a main 
effect of category (F(9, 675) = 26.91, p < .001). Purchase intention was higher when 
SM was low (M = 6.06) than when it was high (M = 5.70), but the difference was not 
significant (p = .17) and no other effects were significant either (ps > .11). However, 
the same 10 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA on offer evaluation revealed main effects of 
category (F(9, 675) = 28.46, p < .001) and SM (F(1, 75) = 6.87, p = .01). No other 
effects were significant (ps >= .31). Consistent with H1b, but not with H1a, offer 
evaluation was higher when SM was low (M = 6.01) than when it was high (M = 
5.56). Using a preference index, which was an average of the individual purchase 
intention and offer evaluation items, led to similar results as on offer evaluation. 
Eye-tracked attention. The same 10 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA on fixation count 
for the surcharge revealed main effects of category (F(9, 684) = 7.83, p < .001) and 
SM (F(1, 76) = 13.41, p < .001), and a marginal interaction between SM and presence 
of total price (F(1, 76) = 2.88, p = .09). No other effects were significant (ps >= .11). 
Consistent with H2, fixation count was higher when SM was high (M = 2.71) than 
when it was low (M = 1.95). The interaction between SM and presence of total price 
was due to a stronger effect of SM when the total price was present (F(1, 41) = 10.50, 
p = .003; Ms = 2.97 and 1.86) versus absent (F(1, 41) = 2.72, p = .11; Ms = 2.46 and 
2.05). 
Although we did not have a hypothesis about attention to the base price, 





computed AoIs for the base prices and repeated the same 10 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA 
on fixation count for the base price. The analysis revealed main effects of category 
(F(9, 684) = 7.23, p < .001), presence of total price (F(1, 76) = 5.88, p = .02), and SM 
(F(1, 76) = 9.26, p = .003). Consistent with our expectations, fixation count was 
higher when the total price was absent (M = 3.0) than when it was present (M = 2.5). 
Fixation count was also higher when SM was high (M = 3.1) than when it was low (M 
= 2.4), perhaps because the larger SM led participants to process not just the 
surcharge, but also the base price in greater detail. 
The same mixed ANOVA on gaze duration (Pieters and Wedel 2007) for the 
surcharge yielded similar results as fixation count, but without the interaction 
between SM and presence of total price. Finally, the same mixed ANOVA on gaze 
duration for the base price yielded similar results as fixation count, but there were 
also additional interactions between category and presence of total price and between 
category and SM. 
Control measures. The same 10 (category) × 2 (SM) × 2 (presence of total 
price) mixed ANOVA on typicality revealed only a main effect of category (F(9, 675) 
= 55.38, p < .001) and a marginal interaction between presence of total price and SM 
(F(1, 75) = 2.81, p < .098), and the same mixed ANOVA on familiarity revealed only 
a main effect of category (F(9, 675) = 30.08, p < .001), suggesting that these 
variables could not explain the results on offer evaluation and attention to the 
surcharge due to the lack of a main effect of SM. Finally, a 2 (category) × 2 (SM) × 2 
(presence of total price) mixed ANOVA on recalled total price revealed a main effect 





category and presence of total price (F(1, 72) = 3.20, p < .078). However, the lack of 
an effect of SM suggests that this variable cannot explain the effects on offer 
evaluation and attention to the surcharge either. 
Discussion 
The purpose of the current study was to attempt to replicate the negative effect 
of SM on preference and the positive effect of SM on attention as in Study 2, but with 
a physiological measure of attention. Consistent with Study 2, there is support for 
H1b on offer evaluation and for H2 on fixation count, a physiological measure of 
attention. Although there was no effect of SM on purchase intention, the effect was in 
the expected direction (p = .17), and likely lacked significance due to low power in 
the sample given the cell size of approximately 20. Additionally, unlike in Study 2, 
mediation tests by using Hayes’s (2012) PROCESS macro did not reveal support for 
mediation by attention to the surcharge, although this might be because the eye-
tracking fixation count and the paper-based offer evaluation are measured by using 
different methods, reducing the likelihood of mediation as compared to using only 
paper-based measures as in Study 2. 
Based on a proposed study in the dissertation proposal, we reran Study 3 (N = 
129) with female participants also participating, no non-partitioned condition, 
modified SMs for two product categories, counterbalanced order for these two 
categories, and recalled price measures added for these two categories. Supporting 
H2, the results from this study revealed a marginal positive effect of SM on fixation 
count for the surcharge (F(1, 125) = 3.20, p = .08; Ms = 2.75 vs. 2.31), but this was 





Additionally, there was no main effect of SM on purchase intention or offer 
evaluation (p > .83 and .54 respectively), although there were interactions between 
category and SM, indicating no support for either H1a or H1b. Therefore, we do not 
report this study in greater detail in the current essay. 
General Discussion 
The extant literature on partitioned pricing and surcharges suggests multiple 
mechanisms for the effect of SM on preference: an upward sloping relationship due to 
anchoring on lower base prices, a downward sloping relationship due to increased 
surcharge salience, and an inverted U-shaped relationship due to the joint effects of 
the two previously mentioned mechanisms. Extant empirical evidence is mixed, with 
strong support for a downward sloping relationship and some support for an upward 
sloping relationship so, in this essay, we attempted to pit these competing 
mechanisms against each other and to identify conditions under which one 
mechanism might be more dominant than the other. 
Consistent with prior research that has shown a positive effect of eBay 
shipping fee on WTP (Cheema 2008; Hossain and Morgan 2006), Study 1 found a 
positive effect of shipping fee on WTP for eBay data across multiple product 
categories, and a category-specific analysis revealed evidence of the dual influences 
of base price anchoring and surcharge salience for the blu-ray trilogy. Study 2, on the 
other hand, used a more controlled, experimental setting and found a positive effect 
of SM on self-reported attention to the surcharge, and a negative effect of shipping 
fee on purchase intention and offer evaluation, consistent with the surcharge salience 





first paper in the partitioned pricing literature that explicitly investigates the role of 
attention in surcharge processing, and mediation testing showed attention to be a 
partial mediator of the effect of SM on purchase intention. 
Although planned contrasts in Study 2 did not reveal the dual influences of 
base price anchoring and surcharge salience, the pattern of means suggests that base 
price anchoring is likely to dominate as a mechanism at lower SMs, till an inflection 
point, after which surcharge salience is likely to dominate as a mechanism. 
Subsequent post hoc analyses confirmed this inference, with post hoc contrasts 
providing support for the dual influences of base price anchoring and surcharge 
salience at different levels of SM. Finally, Study 3 used eye-tracking and again 
showed that SM had a positive effect on attention and a negative effect on offer 
evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first use of eye-tracking to 
demonstrate effects on attention in partitioned pricing. 
Alternative Mechanisms 
Other mechanisms that may explain when one influence dominates the other 
might be based on the pain of paying or chaos theory. The pain of paying suggests 
that consumers don’t like paying for purchases (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998), and 
motivated consumers may focus on surcharges (as they are usually smaller than base 
prices) in order to lessen the pain of paying that is associated with salient pricing 
information. This implies that surcharge salience may be a more dominant underlying 
mechanism due to greater motivated processing for purchases that require a 
justification for the price paid, such as luxuries (vs. necessities) or hedonic purchases 





Chaos theory suggests that small initial differences result in dynamic systems 
having drastically different end states (Kellert 1993; Lorenz 1962). Applying chaos 
theory to partitioned pricing suggests that the determination of when the base price 
anchoring and surcharge salience accounts dominate is not easily testable because 
small differences due to price recall biases can have drastic impacts. As chaos theory 
suggests the same end states as base price anchoring or surcharge salience, it is not 
possible to empirically rule this out as an underlying mechanism. However, we note 
that chaos theory is more relevant to the study of dynamic systems, which evolve 
over time, rather than to the study of experimental systems with an intervention-based 
cause-and-effect structure, implying that chaos theory might be less relevant in the 
current context. 
The Role of Attention 
Both Study 2 and Study 3 suggest that one mechanism through which SM 
operates is attention. However, it is not yet clear whether the mechanism is via 
grasping attention or retaining attention. Attention grasped is primarily a function of 
stimulus salience whereas attention retained is primarily a proxy for the amount of 
processing involving a stimulus, and can be driven by mechanisms such as surcharge 
fairness and surcharge evaluation. The self-reported measure of attention does not 
distinguish between these two types of attention, and the eye-tracked measure of 
fixation count is also likely to take into account the attention-grasping and attention-
retaining roles at play. However, the eye-tracked measure of time to first fixation is a 
good indicator of attention-grasping, and our analysis of this measure from the Study 





effects on offer evaluation are driven by attention-retaining rather than by attention-
grasping. Future research might more explicitly tease apart these two potential roles 
of attention. 
Given the role of attention in the effects demonstrated in this paper, future 
research might also investigate other factors that affect the amount of attention paid to 
stimuli. One such factor would be the typicality of partitioning a surcharge, which 
was defined in Chapter 2 as the degree to which partitioning a surcharge is the norm 
for a particular product category. We expect that typical surcharges do not attract 
undue attention because they are consistent with people’s expectations whereas 
atypical surcharges might attract more attention (Lynch and Srull 1982). Therefore, as 
stated in Appendix 3, we predict that we will continue to see the effect of SM on 
preference for typical surcharges, but that the effect will be attenuated for atypical 
surcharges. Appendix 4 contains the details of studies that we ran to test this 
prediction, based on a proposed study in the dissertation proposal. However, we are 
not including these studies in the main body of this essay due to inconsistent results. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Auctions vs. fixed-price contexts. One concern with the inferences from the 
results in this essay revolves around the differences between auctions and fixed-price 
contexts. The original Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson (1998) paper on partitioned 
pricing had two experiments, one of which was in an auction context. Therefore, 
although there are differences between auctions and fixed-price contexts, previous 
research has examined both as contexts in which partitioned pricing effects might be 





However, we acknowledge one potential difference between the contexts: 
surcharges are likely to be less salient in auctions, suggesting an inherent likelihood 
of stronger evidence for base price anchoring in auctions. In reality, surcharge 
salience may vary within an auction context and also within a fixed-price context, so 
any differences between auctions and fixed-price contexts are more likely to be 
driven by surcharge salience than by the context itself per se. 
At the same time, partitioned pricing affects underlying preference in a 
consistent manner for auctions and fixed-price settings; the commonality is clearer 
when one considers a bidder’s approach to auctions. A bidder sees an item and 
usually has a reference price for the item under auction. The bidder may then adjust 
upward or downward from the reference price based on what she is willing to pay and 
what she thinks other bidders might bid. After adjusting upward or downward, the 
bidder arrives at a winning bid that she decides to enter into the auction mechanism. 
At this point, as previous research suggests (Cheema 2008; Hossain and Morgan 
2006), it appears as if bidders do not completely process the shipping fee or else they 
would adjust their winning bid downwards, so that there would be no effect of 
shipping fee on overall WTP (winning bid + shipping fee). This incomplete 
processing and its consequences are consistent with the base price anchoring 
mechanism that underlies partitioned pricing. Therefore, although auctions might 
differ from fixed-price contexts, partitioned pricing operates in a consistent manner 
across both contexts, allowing us to draw general inferences from studying the 





Inter-category differences in Study 1. Another concern with Study 1 is that the 
results varied across categories. The category-level average RSM values suggest that 
the differences might be because of different RSM ranges in each category. For 
example, the RSM ranges for the blu-ray trilogy and the Pokemon card were 2% to 
696% and 1% to 300% respectively, suggesting scope for the dual influences of base 
price anchoring and surcharge salience to manifest themselves (although the smaller 
upper bound for the Pokemon card might explain why the effect of surcharge salience 
was not strong enough to lead to a significant coefficient for squared shipping fee). 
However, the RSM range for the iPod nano was 2% to 14% (with two outliers at 21% 
and 33%), suggesting insufficient variance in the independent measure for any 
relationship to manifest itself. Similarly, the RSM range for the halogen light bulb 
was 40% to 100%, and the regression results lack a coefficient for shipping fee due to 
insufficient variance in the independent measure. 
Other differences across categories that might be driving the results may be 
because some of the categories were hedonic in nature (e.g., blu-ray trilogy and 
Pokemon card) and the others were more utilitarian (e.g., halogen light bulb). The 
pattern of results across categories suggests that the observed relationships between 
shipping fee and WTP may hold only for hedonic categories. In order to control for 
these inter-category differences, Study 2 used a single product category (a coffee-
table book containing award-winning photographs) that was more hedonic than 
utilitarian in nature, and we also used the same product category in a replication 
attempt for Study 2. Additionally, we framed the product category as more utilitarian 





Unexpected results in Study 2. The results from the Study 2 scenario indicate 
that base price anchoring dominated as the underlying mechanism till 15% RSM and 
surcharge salience dominated as the underlying mechanism from 30% RSM onwards, 
suggesting that the inflection point between these two underlying mechanisms 
occurred in the 15% to 30% range. Therefore, the unexpected results in the 20% and 
25% conditions may be due to the effects of both underlying mechanisms operating 
almost equally strongly at the same time. 
Consistent with the surcharge salience account, if participants more 
completely process the surcharge, they may have less uncertainty about the surcharge 
price and, instead of adjusting up from the base price, they may attempt to perform a 
mathematical addition operation (base price + surcharge) in order to arrive at the total 
price. However, if base price anchoring is also operating relatively strongly at the 
same time, the anchoring and adjustment process might provide a different 
mechanism by which participants attempt to arrive at the total price. 
The consequence of these dual mechanisms might be some confusion and 
uncertainty for participants, which may reduce subsequent preference and intentions. 
In order to test this possibility, we isolated just the anomalous conditions (20% and 
25%), and then checked the correlations between the dependent measures (purchase 
intention and offer evaluation) and the other measures, especially pricing clarity, 
confidence in recalled total price, and confidence in recalled shipping fee. 
Although these correlations were not significant (ps > .12 and .75 for purchase 
intention and offer evaluation respectively), the correlations with seller trust (rs = .29 





fairness (rs = .53 and .57, ps < .001 for purchase intention and offer evaluation) were 
significant. The significant correlations with surcharge fairness are consistent with the 
partial mediation by surcharge fairness across all eight conditions, so this is not 
surprising. However, the significant correlations with seller trust suggest that the 
potential confusion and uncertainty due to the competing mechanisms may have 
resulted in lower trust in the seller, which might be driving the anomalous results in 
the 20% and 25% conditions. 
Another possibility is that the specific price levels in the 20% and 25% 
conditions were more typical or atypical than in the other conditions, which may be 
driving the anomalous results for these two conditions. From a search of price levels 
during stimuli design, all surcharge prices were ecologically valid, so they appear to 
be relatively typical. If the surcharge prices in these two conditions were more typical 
than in the other six conditions, this would suggest that participants should have paid 
less attention to them. However, the attention measure reveals that this is not a 
common explanation for the two conditions (Ms = 4.6 and 5.9 respectively). 
Alternatively, if the surcharge prices were more atypical than in the other six 
conditions, this would suggest that participants should have paid more attention to 
them (again unsupported as the attention measure varied across the two conditions) 
and/or also reacted negatively due to violation of an injunctive (fairness) norm. 
However, surcharge fairness alone does not seem to provide a plausible explanation 
because purchase intention in the 30% condition was higher than in the 20% and 25% 
conditions, whereas surcharge fairness for the 30% condition was between the 





One plausible explanation based on typicality might be related to the 
typicality of partitioning the surcharge rather than to the typicality of the surcharge 
price. The typicality of partitioning the shipping fee in this scenario was directionally 
lower for the 20% and 25% conditions (Ms = 5.2 and 5.0 vs. 5.3 for the next lowest 
condition), and this relative atypicality of partitioning may have raised attention 
(unsupported as the attention measure varied across these two conditions) and/or also 
violated an injunctive (fairness) norm. It is not clear if participants responded to the 
surcharge fairness measure with this violation in mind (in addition to the surcharge 
price violating an injunctive norm), but future research might employ distinct 
measures for fairness of partitioning the shipping surcharge and fairness of the 
surcharge price in order to explain the unexpected results. 
Effect of price level and presentational factors in Study 2. The RSM level for 
the inflection point between base price anchoring and surcharge salience need not be 
the same for all product categories, and it may even vary within a product category 
based on the price level. Changing the price level (e.g., $157.82 or $27.82 instead of 
$57.82) will result in different RSM levels if we use the same ASMs as were used in 
Study 2. However, we expect that the observed relationship between SM and 
preference in Study 2 will hold only for similar RSM levels, suggesting that we 
would also have to change the ASMs corresponding to the change in price level, so 
that the new RSM levels are similar to the levels used in Study 2. If price level is 
changed without changing the ASM levels, the effect on preference would depend on 
whether price level is increased or decreased: if price level is increased, the new RSM 





evidence for base price anchoring and, if price level is decreased, the new RSM levels 
would be higher than in Study 2, suggesting that we would be more likely to see 
evidence for surcharge salience. 
If the presentation format of the surcharge is changed from $ to %, the price 
recall bias underlying partitioned pricing should be more likely to occur given that the 
computation of total price will be more cognitively taxing for % surcharges. This 
should lead to a stronger effect of base price anchoring at all SM levels because, even 
when surcharge salience is high and the % surcharge is completely processed, 
converting the % to a $ amount may lead to anchoring and adjustment. Finally, if the 
total price is provided, the meta-analysis in Chapter 2 suggests a weaker effect of 
partitioned pricing due to attenuation of the price recall bias, and we expect a 
similarly attenuated influence of SM on preference through base price anchoring. 
However, we expect a continued influence of SM on attention to the surcharge 
through surcharge salience, and a continued influence of SM on preference through 
surcharge fairness (assuming that an injunctive norm is violated). 
Managerial Implications and Conclusion 
From a managerial perspective, the role of attention in the effect of SM on 
preference suggests that salient surcharges are processed more completely and reduce 
preference. On the other hand, the positive effect of SM on WTP for eBay auctions 
suggests that SM might have a positive effect on preference when the surcharges are 
less salient. The lower salience could be due to stimulus characteristics such as low 
levels of SM (e.g., the 5%, 10%, and 15% conditions in Study 2) and/or due to 





salient shipping fees. Therefore, if managers know beforehand that surcharges will be 
less salient (e.g., low SM levels or typical surcharges such as eBay shipping), 
preference should be highest if managers make the SM as high as possible subject to 
the SM itself not increasing salience. On the other hand, if managers know 
beforehand that surcharges will be more salient (e.g., high SM levels or atypical 
surcharges such as cell phone Web features), preference should be highest if 
managers make the SM as low as possible. 
In conclusion, we hope that this paper provides some guidance to managers 
about when to make SMs as high as possible – when the surcharges will not be salient 
– and when to make SMs as low as possible – when the surcharges will be salient. We 
also hope that this paper spurs further research on the dual roles of attention – 
attention-grasping and attention-retaining – as well as on factors such as typicality of 






























































































































































































































Tax, dollar 18 81 .46 .45 .05 81 19.75 .58 .39 
19 
Burman and 
Biswas (2007)                        
1, offer value 
High NFC, 
reasonable 
19 40.5 1.06 1.04 .11 40.5 8.93 .26 .40 
20 
Burman and 
Biswas (2007)                        
1, offer value 
Low NFC, 
reasonable 
20 40.5 -.07 -.07 .10 40.5 10.12 .30 -.03 
21 
Burman and 
Biswas (2007)                        
1, offer value 
High NFC, 
unreasonable 
21 41.5 -.74 -.73 .10 41.5 9.73 .29 -.31 
22 
Burman and 
Biswas (2007)                        
1, offer value 
Low NFC, 
unreasonable 
22 41.5 .20 .19 .10 41.5 10.33 .30 .09 
23 
Burman and 
Biswas (2007)                        
2, offer value 
High NFC, 
reasonable 
23 30 1.29 1.25 .16 30 6.27 .18 .34 
24 
Burman and 
Biswas (2007)                        
2, offer value 
Low NFC, 
reasonable 
24 30 -.46 -.45 .14 30 7.31 .21 -.14 
25 
Burman and 
Biswas (2007)                        
2, offer value 
High NFC, 
unreasonable 
25 48.5 -1.01 -1.00 .09 48.5 10.79 .32 -.47 
26 
Burman and 
Biswas (2007)                        
2, offer value 
Low NFC, 
unreasonable 
26 48.5 -.01 -.01 .08 48.5 12.12 .36 .00 
27 
Burman and 
Biswas (2007)                        
3, offer value 
High NFC, 
reasonable 
27 52.5 .95 .93 .08 52.5 11.83 .35 .48 
28 
Burman and 
Biswas (2007)                        
3, offer value 
Low NFC, 
reasonable 
28 52.5 -.16 -.16 .08 52.5 13.09 .38 -.09 
29 
Burman and 
Biswas (2007)                        
3, offer value 
High NFC, 
unreasonable 
29 45.5 -1.15 -1.13 .10 45.5 9.82 .29 -.48 
30 
Burman and 
Biswas (2007)                        
3, offer value 
Low NFC, 
unreasonable 




























Biswas (2007)                        
4, offer value 
High NFC, 
reasonable 
31 34.67 1.06 1.04 .13 34.67 7.64 .22 .35 
32 
Burman and 
Biswas (2007)                        
4, offer value 
Low NFC, 
reasonable 
32 34.67 .04 .04 .12 34.67 8.67 .25 .01 
33 
Burman and 
Biswas (2007)                        
4, offer value 
High NFC, 
unreasonable 
33 34.67 -.91 -.89 .13 34.67 7.89 .23 -.31 
34 
Burman and 
Biswas (2007)                        
4, offer value 
Low NFC, 
unreasonable 









































































40 41 -.69 -.67 .10 41 9.70 .28 -.29 





41 140 -.53 -.53 .03 70 33.81 .99 -.78 





42 140 -.15 -.15 .03 70 34.90 1.02 -.23 






43 100 -.03 -.03 .04 100 25.00 .73 -.03 

















1, revenue Xbox game 47 20 .17 .16 .20 20 4.98 .15 .04 





48 55 -.58 -.57 .08 55 13.22 .39 -.33 





49 55 .54 .53 .08 55 13.29 .39 .31 




































51 55 .54 .54 .08 55 13.27 .39 .31 
52 Kim (2006)                                      
2, purchase 
intention 
Stimulus 52 143 -.34 -.34 .03 71.5 35.24 1.03 -.52 
53 Kim (2006)                                      
2, purchase 
intention 
Recall 53 143 .35 .35 .03 71.5 35.22 1.03 .53 
54 






54 60 -.52 -.51 .07 60 14.52 .43 -.33 
55 






55 57 -.08 -.08 .07 57 14.24 .42 -.05 
56 
Lee, Choi, and 
Li (2014) 




56 99 .46 .45 .04 49.5 24.13 .71 .48 
57 
Lee, Choi, and 
Li (2014) 




57 99 -.13 -.12 .04 49.5 24.70 .72 -.13 
58 






58 101 .71 .71 .04 50.5 23.76 .70 .74 
59 






59 101 -.11 -.11 .04 50.5 25.21 .74 -.12 
60 






60 126 .55 .55 .03 63 30.36 .89 .73 
61 






61 126 .11 .11 .03 63 31.45 .92 .15 
62 Love (2012) 
1, choice of 
low-tier 
brand 
MP3 62 62 -.45 -.45 .07 62 15.12 .44 -.30 
63 Love (2012) 






























64 Love (2012) 




64 64.5 .39 .39 .06 64.5 15.83 .46 .27 
65 Love (2012) 3, revenue 
Low-tier 
brand 
65 134 -.48 -.48 .03 134 32.57 .95 -.68 
66 Love (2012) 3, revenue 
High-tier 
brand 



















1, total price 64 GB 69 376 -.01 -.01 .01 376 94.00 2.76 -.04 
70 






70 150 -.42 -.42 .03 150 36.69 1.08 -.67 
71 























is not norm 










































is not norm 



















(2005)          
1, offer 
liking 
Combined 78 182 .15 .15 .02 182 45.37 1.33 .30 
79 
Sheng, Bao, and 





79 27 .66 .64 .16 27 6.42 .19 .18 
80 
Sheng, Bao, and 





80 28 .19 .19 .14 28 6.97 .20 .06 
81 
Sheng, Bao, and 





81 27 -.48 -.46 .15 27 6.57 .19 -.13 
82 
Sheng, Bao, and 
Pan (2007)                      
2, purchase 
intention 
Base price > 
surcharge 
82 51 .08 .08 .08 51 12.74 .37 .05 
83 
Sheng, Bao, and 
Pan (2007)                      
2, purchase 
intention 
Base price < 
surcharge 
83 53 -.64 -.63 .08 53 12.61 .37 -.35 
84 
Sheng, Bao, and 
































Sheng, Bao, and 













Combined 86 318 .33 .33 .01 318 78.44 2.30 1.12 
87 







87 88 .49 .49 .05 88 21.36 .63 .46 
88 







88 239 -.23 -.23 .02 239 59.37 1.74 -.59 
89 
Xia and Monroe 
(2004)                           
1, purchase 
intention 
Combined 89 156 .47 .47 .03 156 37.95 1.11 .78 
90 
Yao and Zhang 
(2012) 
1, beta of 
free shipping  

















































































































































































Tax, dollar 18 75 .62 .61 .06 75 17.90 .52 .48 
107 
Burman and 






19 40.5 1.42 1.39 .12 40.5 8.16 .24 .49 
108 
Burman and 






20 40.5 -.07 -.07 .10 40.5 10.12 .30 -.03 
109 
Burman and 






21 41.5 -1.15 -1.13 .11 41.5 8.95 .26 -.44 
110 
Burman and 






22 41.5 .25 .25 .10 41.5 10.30 .30 .11 
111 
Burman and 






23 30 .87 .84 .15 30 6.89 .20 .25 
112 
Burman and 






24 30 -.38 -.37 .14 30 7.37 .22 -.12 
113 
Burman and 






25 48.5 -1.11 -1.09 .09 48.5 10.55 .31 -.50 
114 
Burman and 








































27 52.5 1.37 1.35 .09 52.5 10.69 .31 .63 
116 
Burman and 






28 52.5 .22 .22 .08 52.5 13.05 .38 .12 
117 
Burman and 






29 45.5 -1.07 -1.05 .10 45.5 9.99 .29 -.46 
118 
Burman and 






30 45.5 .15 .15 .09 45.5 11.34 .33 .08 
119 
Burman and 






31 34.67 1.83 1.78 .16 34.67 6.20 .18 .48 
120 
Burman and 






32 34.67 .50 .49 .12 34.67 8.42 .25 .18 
121 
Burman and 






33 34.67 -1.12 -1.09 .13 34.67 7.55 .22 -.36 
122 
Burman and 











































































40 41 -1.47 -1.45 .12 41 8.13 .24 -.51 
127 de Faria (2010) 




43 100 -.23 -.23 .04 100 24.84 .73 -.25 
128 de Faria (2010) 
Part A, offer 
attractiveness 









1, number of 
bids 




1, number of 
bidders 




1, number of 
bids 





























1, number of 
bidders 
Xbox game 47 20 .65 .62 .21 20 4.77 .14 .13 
134 Kim (2006)                                      
2, recalled 
price 
Combined 91 143 1.44 1.44 .04 143 28.41 .83 1.78 
135 
Lee and Han 
(2002) 
1, % recall 
error 
Combined 92 141 .77 .77 .03 141 32.85 .96 1.10 
136 






54 60 -.42 -.41 .07 60 14.68 .43 -.27 
137 






55 57 -.21 -.20 .07 57 14.18 .42 -.13 
138 






58 101 .47 .47 .04 50.5 24.57 .72 .51 
139 






59 101 .13 .13 .04 50.5 25.20 .74 .14 
140 






60 126 .46 .45 .03 63 30.71 .90 .61 
141 






61 126 .22 .22 .03 63 31.31 .92 .30 
142 Love (2012) 
1, choice of 
low-tier 
brand 




Williams (2007)         
1, recalled 
cost 




Williams (2007)         
2, recalled 
cost 
Combined 94 308 .21 .21 .01 308 76.57 2.24 .71 
145 
Sheng, Bao, and 































Sheng, Bao, and 




85 39 .10 .10 .10 39 9.74 .29 .04 
147 
Xia and Monroe 
(2004)                           
1, price 
satisfaction 
Combined 89 156 .26 .26 .03 156 38.67 1.13 .44 
148 
Xia and Monroe 
(2004)                           
1, perceived 
value 
Combined 89 156 .26 .26 .03 156 38.68 1.13 .43 
149 
Xia and Monroe 




Combined 89 156 .25 .25 .03 156 38.70 1.13 .42 
            
M = 
-.02 











APPENDIX 2: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR META-ANALYSIS OBSERVATIONS 
Note: (a = common control, b = DV type, c = multiple scale-items, d = no. of variables manipulated, e = published, f = 
study outside US, g = within-subject, h = year, i = ASM, j = RSM, k = price level, l = surcharge benefit, m = surcharge 
controllability, n = surcharge format, o = seller reputation, p = total price present, q = typicality of partitioning) 
 
# (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) 
1 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 10 6.99 4.19 173.99 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
2 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 0 6.99 4.19 173.99 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
3 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 10 19.99 12.98 173.99 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
4 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 10 19.99 12.98 173.99 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
5 -1 1 -1 2 1 1 -1 10 8.00 5.00 168.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
6 -1 1 -1 2 1 1 -1 10 .11 4.78 2.41 -1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
7 -1 1 -1 2 -1 1 -1 10 2.50 3.45 75.00 1 -1 -1 0 -1 1 
8 -1 1 -1 2 -1 1 -1 10 2.50 3.45 75.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
9 -1 1 -1 2 1 -1 -1 6 10.00 4.88 215.00 1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
10 -1 1 -1 2 1 -1 -1 9 10.00 4.88 215.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
11 -1 1 1 3 1 -1 -1 9 1.50 17.14 10.25 1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
12 -1 1 1 3 1 -1 -1 9 1.50 17.14 10.25 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
13 -1 1 1 3 1 -1 -1 9 1.50 17.14 10.25 1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
14 -1 1 1 3 1 -1 -1 9 1.50 17.14 10.25 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
15 1 1 -1 3 -1 -1 -1 9 41.94 6.00 740.47 1 1 1 0 -1 1 
16 1 1 -1 3 -1 -1 -1 9 41.94 6.00 740.47 1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
17 1 1 -1 3 -1 -1 -1 9 41.94 6.00 740.47 -1 -1 1 0 -1 1 
18 1 1 -1 3 -1 -1 -1 9 41.94 6.00 740.47 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 1 
19 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 9 39.50 15.86 288.50 -1 0 -1 0 -1 1 
20 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 9 39.50 15.86 288.50 -1 0 -1 0 -1 1 
21 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 9 39.50 15.86 288.50 -1 0 -1 0 -1 1 
22 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 9 39.50 15.86 288.50 -1 0 -1 0 -1 1 
23 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 9 19.99 13.33 169.98 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
24 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 9 19.99 13.33 169.98 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 




# (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) 
26 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 9 19.99 13.33 169.98 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
27 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 9 19.99 10.00 219.98 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
28 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 7 19.99 10.00 219.98 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
29 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 9 19.99 10.00 219.98 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
30 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 9 19.99 10.00 219.98 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
31 1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 9 8.95 4.50 207.95 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
32 1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 9 8.95 4.50 207.95 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
33 1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 9 18.95 10.03 207.95 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
34 1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 9 18.95 10.03 207.95 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
35 -1 -1 0 3 1 -1 -1 9 100.00 25.00 499.95 1 1 -1 0 -1 0 
36 -1 -1 0 3 1 -1 -1 10 82.50 20.25 489.95 1 1 -1 0 -1 0 
37 -1 1 1 3 1 -1 -1 10 1.00 5.00 21.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
38 -1 1 1 3 1 -1 -1 8 5.00 5.00 105.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
39 -1 1 1 3 1 -1 -1 8 7.00 35.00 27.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
40 -1 1 1 3 1 -1 -1 8 35.00 35.00 135.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
41 -1 1 -1 2 1 -1 -1 14 9.86 37.92 35.86 -1 0 -1 -1 1 1 
42 -1 1 -1 2 1 -1 -1 14 9.86 37.92 35.86 -1 0 -1 1 1 1 
43 1 1 1 2 -1 1 -1 12 9.00 30.01 38.99 -1 -1 -1 0 1 1 
44 1 1 1 2 -1 1 -1 12 9.00 30.01 38.99 -1 1 -1 0 1 1 
45 -1 -1 0 1 1 -1 -1 12 32.50 36.13 122.45 -1 1 -1 0 1 1 
46 -1 -1 0 3 1 -1 -1 12 3.99 82.27 8.84 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 
47 -1 -1 0 3 1 -1 -1 12 3.99 11.92 37.48 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 
48 1 1 -1 3 1 -1 -1 12 12.76 18.50 81.75 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
49 1 1 -1 3 1 -1 -1 12 12.76 18.50 81.75 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
50 1 1 -1 3 1 -1 -1 16 12.76 18.50 81.75 -1 1 1 0 -1 1 
51 1 1 -1 3 1 -1 -1 16 12.76 18.50 81.75 -1 1 1 0 -1 1 
52 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 12 21.95 7.70 306.90 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
53 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 12 21.95 7.70 306.90 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
54 -1 1 1 4 1 1 1 14 76.30 10.00 839.00 0 0 1 0 -1 0 
55 -1 1 1 4 1 1 1 14 76.30 10.00 839.00 0 0 1 0 -1 0 
56 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 14 11.00 31.44 45.99 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 




# (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) 
58 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 15 40.00 8.16 529.99 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
59 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 15 40.00 8.16 529.99 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
60 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 15 38.00 10.64 395.00 -1 0 -1 0 -1 1 
61 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 15 38.00 10.64 395.00 -1 0 -1 0 -1 1 
62 -1 -1 0 3 1 -1 1 12 15.00 75.00 35.00 1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
63 1 -1 0 2 1 -1 -1 12 100.00 45.45 320.00 1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
64 1 -1 0 2 1 -1 -1 13 100.00 33.33 400.00 1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
65 -1 -1 0 2 1 -1 -1 12 18.62 8.47 238.39 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
66 -1 -1 0 2 1 -1 -1 12 16.54 4.51 383.46 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
67 -1 -1 0 2 1 -1 -1 16 12.95 18.51 82.90 -1 1 0 0 -1 1 
68 -1 -1 0 1 1 -1 -1 16 17.42 2.62 683.03 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
69 -1 -1 0 1 1 -1 -1 16 24.81 3.19 802.02 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
70 -1 1 1 3 1 1 -1 16 1.00 .30 336.33 -1 0 -1 -1 1 0 
71 -1 1 1 3 1 1 -1 12 1.00 .30 336.33 -1 0 -1 1 1 0 
72 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 12 9.99 12.81 87.98 1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
73 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 4 9.99 12.81 87.98 1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
74 -1 1 -1 2 -1 -1 -1 4 9.99 13.69 82.98 1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
75 -1 1 -1 2 -1 -1 -1 16 9.99 13.69 82.98 1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
76 -1 1 -1 2 -1 1 -1 16 90.00 18.83 568.00 -1 1 -1 0 1 1 
77 -1 1 -1 2 -1 1 -1 4 90.00 3.63 2568.00 -1 1 -1 0 1 1 
78 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 4 15.00 23.08 80.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
79 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 1 8 5.00 10.01 54.95 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
80 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 1 8 15.00 30.03 64.95 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
81 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 1 10 25.00 50.05 74.95 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
82 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 1 10 9.00 18.04 58.90 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
83 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 1 10 9.00 113.92 16.90 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
84 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 1 9 49.00 5.51 939.00 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 
85 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 1 9 49.00 5.51 939.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
86 -1 -1 0 2 1 1 -1 9 12.00 20.29 71.13 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
87 -1 1 1 2 -1 -1 -1 9 4.03 11.99 37.65 1 1 1 0 1 1 
88 -1 1 1 2 -1 -1 -1 9 6.41 20.52 37.65 1 1 1 0 1 1 




# (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) 
90 -1 -1 0 10 1 -1 -1 9 18.48 3.39 562.72 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
91 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 9 6.99 4.19 173.99 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
92 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 9 6.99 4.19 173.99 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
93 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 9 19.99 12.98 173.99 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
94 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 9 19.99 12.98 173.99 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
95 -1 1 -1 2 1 1 -1 9 8.00 5.00 168.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
96 -1 1 -1 2 1 1 -1 9 8.00 5.00 168.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
97 -1 1 -1 2 1 1 -1 9 8.00 5.00 168.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
98 -1 1 -1 2 1 1 -1 9 .35 5.00 7.35 -1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
99 -1 1 -1 2 1 1 -1 9 1.50 6.00 26.50 -1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
100 -1 1 -1 2 1 1 -1 4 .25 5.00 5.25 -1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
101 -1 1 -1 2 1 -1 -1 12 10.00 4.88 215.00 1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
102 -1 1 -1 2 1 -1 -1 12 10.00 4.88 215.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
103 1 -1 0 3 -1 -1 -1 12 41.94 6.00 740.47 1 1 1 0 -1 1 
104 1 -1 0 3 -1 -1 -1 12 41.94 6.00 740.47 1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
105 1 -1 0 3 -1 -1 -1 12 41.94 6.00 740.47 -1 -1 1 0 -1 1 
106 1 -1 0 3 -1 -1 -1 12 41.94 6.00 740.47 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 1 
107 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 12 39.50 15.86 288.50 -1 0 -1 0 -1 1 
108 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 12 39.50 15.86 288.50 -1 0 -1 0 -1 1 
109 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 12 39.50 15.86 288.50 -1 0 -1 0 -1 1 
110 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 12 39.50 15.86 288.50 -1 0 -1 0 -1 1 
111 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 12 19.99 13.33 169.98 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
112 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 12 19.99 13.33 169.98 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
113 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 12 19.99 13.33 169.98 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
114 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 16 19.99 13.33 169.98 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
115 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 16 19.99 10.00 219.98 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
116 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 16 19.99 10.00 219.98 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
117 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 16 19.99 10.00 219.98 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
118 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 14 19.99 10.00 219.98 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
119 1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 13 8.95 4.50 207.95 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
120 1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 12 8.95 4.50 207.95 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 




# (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) 
122 1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 8 18.95 10.03 207.95 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
123 -1 1 1 3 1 -1 -1 9 1.00 5.00 21.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
124 -1 1 1 3 1 -1 -1 9 5.00 5.00 105.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
125 -1 1 1 3 1 -1 -1 4 7.00 35.00 27.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
126 -1 1 1 3 1 -1 -1 4 35.00 35.00 135.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
127 1 1 1 2 -1 1 -1 6 9.00 30.01 38.99 -1 -1 -1 0 1 1 
128 1 1 1 2 -1 1 -1 6 9.00 30.01 38.99 -1 1 -1 0 1 1 
129 -1 -1 0 1 1 -1 -1 6 32.50 36.13 122.45 -1 1 -1 0 1 1 
130 -1 -1 0 3 1 -1 -1 9 3.99 1.26 320.00 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 
131 -1 -1 0 3 1 -1 -1 9 3.99 1.26 320.00 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 
132 -1 -1 0 3 1 -1 -1 9 3.99 1.70 238.39 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 
133 -1 -1 0 3 1 -1 -1 9 3.99 1.70 238.39 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 
134 -1 -1 0 2 1 -1 -1 8 21.95 7.70 306.90 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
135 -1 -1 0 4 1 1 1 8 76.30 10.00 839.00 0 0 1 0 -1 0 
136 -1 1 1 4 1 1 1 8 76.30 10.00 839.00 0 0 1 0 -1 0 
137 -1 1 1 4 1 1 1 12 76.30 10.00 839.00 0 0 1 0 -1 0 
138 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 12 40.00 8.16 529.99 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
139 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 14 40.00 8.16 529.99 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
140 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 13 38.00 10.64 395.00 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 
141 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 -1 13 38.00 10.64 395.00 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 
142 -1 -1 0 3 1 -1 1 13 100.00 50.00 300.00 1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 
143 -1 -1 0 1 -1 -1 -1 13 9.99 12.81 87.98 1 0 -1 0 -1 0 
144 -1 -1 0 2 -1 -1 -1 13 9.99 13.69 82.98 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 
145 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 1 13 49.00 5.51 939.00 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 
146 -1 1 1 2 1 -1 1 8 49.00 5.51 939.00 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 
147 -1 1 1 4 1 -1 -1 8 104.00 8.92 1270.00 -1 0 0 0 -1 1 
148 -1 1 1 4 1 -1 -1 8 104.00 8.92 1270.00 -1 0 0 0 -1 1 







APPENDIX 3: THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS FOR MODERATING EFFECT OF 
TYPICALITY 
 
We investigate the role of the typicality of partitioning a surcharge, which we 
defined in Chapter 2 as the degree to which partitioning a surcharge is representative of 
the descriptive norm (Briesch et al. 1997) for a particular product category. The price 
recall bias effect found by Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson (1998) is predicated on the 
fact that consumers do not notice the surcharges presented to them. While this might be 
true in the case of common surcharges such as taxes or shipping fees, surcharges that 
are not usually partitioned out of the total price could attract attention to themselves by 
being more visually salient because of the novelty associated with partitioning them. 
Redden, Fitzsimons, and Williams (2007) examine this issue by focusing on 
descriptive norms (Briesch et al. 1997), which specify what consumers have come to 
expect from a firm given how it has behaved in the past and given what other firms are 
doing in the marketplace. These norms help consumers set expectations regarding how 
they believe things will be, and Redden and colleagues found that, when partitioning is 
not the norm, the price recall bias due to partitioning might be attenuated, with further 
negative consequences due to perceived violations of fairness. Hamilton and Srivastava 
(2008) also address this issue in their second study. The authors found that participants 
were less likely to choose a supplier offering free labor (versus another supplier 
offering the same total price, with 43% apportioned as labor costs) when they believed 
that free labor was less common. This stream of research suggests that descriptive 






When partitioning a surcharge is the norm for a particular category, we define 
the typicality of partitioning as being high or typical and, when partitioning a 
surcharge is not the norm for a particular category, we define the typicality of 
partitioning as being low or atypical. Atypical partitioning does not conform to 
consumers’ expectations, because of which the salience of the partitioned component 
is increased (Lynch and Srull 1982). On the other hand, typical partitioning conforms 
to consumers’ expectations, and it does not increase the salience of the partitioned 
component. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: Atypical partitioning will (a) increase the attention paid to surcharges 






APPENDIX 4: STUDIES TO TEST MODERATING EFFECT OF TYPICALITY 
 
Participants and Procedure 
Two hundred and fifty-three students participated in these studies for course 
credit. Study 4a was an eye-tracking and paper-based study, and Study 4b was a 
paper-based study. Sample size for Study 4a was predetermined as the number of 
participants in 15 one-hour research sessions (141), and sample size for Study 4b was 
predetermined as the number of participants in 18 one-hour research sessions, but 
who had not done Study 4a (112). Data collection stopped at the end of the 
predetermined number of sessions. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (SM: low, high) 
× 2 (typicality of partitioning: typical, atypical) between-subjects design. Participants 
were asked to imagine that they were thinking of purchasing a new digital camera to 
take on an upcoming vacation. They were informed that they searched online and 
found a Nikon D3100 camera (picture displayed) that was rated 4.75 stars out of 5 by 
Consumer Reports. The camera had a wide-angle zoom lens and the seller would ship 
it to their home. For Study 4a, participants saw the base price and the surcharge on 
the next computer screen, and for Study 4b, the base price and the surcharge were 
provided below the scenario details. In the typical conditions, the base price was for 
“Camera (incl. lens)” and the surcharge was for “Shipping,” and in the atypical 
conditions, the base price was for “Camera (incl. shipping)” and the surcharge was 






and the surcharge was $7.69, and in the high SM conditions, the base price was 
$498.67 and the surcharge was $14.69. 
Participants then responded to paper-based measures for purchase intention, 
offer evaluation, seller motives, attention to the surcharge, surcharge evaluation, 
perceived SM, quality of camera, shipping, and lens, shipping and lens benefit, 
typicality of lens and shipping surcharge, typical price range for shipping and lens 
surcharge, and familiarity with digital cameras. From these measures, we computed 
measures of quality, benefit, typicality of partitioning, and typical price ranges for the 
surcharged and non-surcharge components. All scales used seven-point scale-items 
except the typicality measures, which used nine-point scale-items. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. A 2 (SM: low, high) × 2 (typicality: typical, atypical) 
ANOVA on typicality of the surcharged component revealed only the expected effect 
of typicality (Study 4a: F(1, 136) = 27.81, p < .001; Study 4b: F(1, 101) = 27.24, p < 
.001), indicating a successful manipulation. Typicality was higher in the typical 
conditions (Ms = 7.0 and 6.9) than in the atypical conditions (Ms = 5.2 and 4.9). The 
same ANOVA on the perceived SM measure revealed (marginally) significant effects 
of SM (Study 4a: F(1, 137) = 6.78, p = .01; Study 4b: F(1, 108) = 3.65, p = .06) and 
typicality (Study 4a: F(1, 137) = 5.76, p = .02; Study 4b: F(1, 108) = 5.41, p = .02), 
indicating a successful manipulation. As expected, perceived SM was higher for high 
SM (Ms = 3.6 and 3.5) than for low SM (Ms = 3.1 and 3.0), and it was also higher in 







Purchase intention. A 2 (SM: low, high) × 2 (typicality: typical, atypical) 
between-subjects ANOVA on Study 4a purchase intention revealed only a marginal 
effect of typicality (F(1, 137) = 2.79, p = .097). Purchase intention was marginally 
lower in the typical condition (M = 3.8) than in the atypical condition (M = 4.2). 
Planned t-tests did not reveal effects of SM in either the typical or the atypical 
conditions. The same 2 × 2 ANOVA on Study 4b purchase intention revealed no 
effects (ps > .27), likely due to insufficient power in the sample. Planned t-tests again 
did not reveal effects of SM in either the typical or the atypical conditions. 
Offer evaluation. A 2 (SM: low, high) × 2 (typicality: typical, atypical) 
between-subjects ANOVA on Study 4a offer evaluation revealed marginal effects of 
SM (F(1, 137) = 2.88, p = .09) and typicality (F(1, 137) = 3.62, p = .06) and an 
interaction between SM and typicality (F(1, 137) = 7.15, p = .008). Offer evaluation 
was lower when SM was low (M = 3.8) than when it was high (M = 4.1), and in the 
typical condition (M = 3.7) than in the atypical condition (M = 4.1). The interaction 
revealed that there was a positive effect of SM in the typical conditions (Ms = 3.3 vs. 
4.2, p = .003), but no effect in the atypical conditions (Ms = 4.2 vs. 4.0, p = .49), 
which is consistent with H3b. 
The same 2 × 2 ANOVA on Study 4b offer evaluation revealed only a 
marginal interaction between SM and typicality (F(1, 108) = 3.72, p = .06). The 
interaction revealed that there was a negative effect of SM in the typical conditions 
(Ms = 4.3 and 3.5, p = .03), but no effect in the atypical conditions (Ms = 4.0 and 4.2, 
p = .62), which is consistent with H3b. A preference measure that was created by 






results as on offer evaluation. Although both studies offer support for the moderating 
role of typicality on the effect of SM on preference, the pattern of results differs. The 
Study 4b pattern was in line with predictions, suggesting more noisy downstream 
measures in Study 4a due to the intermediate eye-tracking data collection. 
Attention to the surcharge. The same 2 × 2 ANOVA on Study 4a fixation 
count revealed only a marginal interaction between SM and typicality (F(1, 137) = 
3.73, p = .06). The interaction revealed that, consistent with H3a, there was a positive 
effect of SM in the typical conditions (Ms = 1.8 and 2.8, p = .01), but no effect in the 
atypical conditions (Ms = 2.6 and 2.4, p = .78). The same 2 × 2 ANOVA on gaze time 
revealed a similar pattern of means, but there was only a marginal main effect of SM 
(F(1, 137) = 2.79, p = .097). The same 2 × 2 ANOVA on Study 4a self-reported 
attention revealed only main effects of SM (F(1, 137) = 8.07, p = .005) and typicality 
(F(1, 137) = 6.16, p = .01), but no interaction. Finally, the same 2 × 2 ANOVA on 
Study 4b self-reported attention did not reveal any effects (all ps > .20). We return to 
the discrepancy between the eye-tracked and paper-based measures in the discussion. 
Surcharge evaluation. The same 2 × 2 ANOVA on Study 4a surcharge 
evaluation revealed only a main effect of typicality (F(1, 137) = 10.75, p = .001). 
Surcharge evaluation was higher in the atypical condition than in the typical condition 
(Ms = 4.7 vs. 3.9), suggesting that atypicality led to increased surcharge evaluation 
for both low and high SMs, which might explain the effect on Study 4a offer 
evaluation. The same 2 × 2 ANOVA on Study 4b surcharge evaluation revealed only 
a main effect of SM (F(1, 137) = 5.22, p = .02). Surcharge evaluation was higher 






effect on Study 4b offer evaluation. However, the effects on surcharge evaluation in 
Studies 4a and 4b are inconsistent with each other and cannot explain the effects of 
interest across the studies. 
Alternative explanations. In both studies, camera quality, benefit of the non-
surcharged component, and typical price ranges for both components varied by 
condition, but the other measures did not vary in one or both studies, ruling them out 
as underlying mechanisms for the effects on attention and preference. A 2 (SM: low, 
high) × 2 (typicality: typical, atypical) ANOVA revealed that Study 4a camera quality 
was higher when SM was low (F(1, 137) = 4.17, p = .04; Ms = 5.9 vs. 5.6), but Study 
4b camera quality was marginally lower when SM was low (F(1, 108) = 3.88, p = .05; 
Ms = 5.5 vs. 5.9), ruling out camera quality as an explanation for the effects of 
interest. The same 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed that benefit of the non-surcharged 
component was (marginally) higher in the typical condition (Study 4a: F(1, 136) = 
4.00, p = .048; Ms = 5.7 vs. 5.2 and Study 4b: F(1, 101) = 3.64, p = .06; Ms = 5.8 vs. 
5.4), but this should result in higher offer evaluation in the typical condition than in 
the atypical condition. However, we observe the opposite in Study 4b, ruling out 
benefit of the non-surcharged component as an underlying driver of the effects of 
interest. 
The same 2 × 2 ANOVA on the price range lower and upper bounds for the 
surcharged and non-surcharged components revealed (marginal) main effects of SM 
(Study 4a: F(1, 136) = 2.78, p = .098 and Study 4b: F(1, 101) = 3.14, p = .08) and 
typicality (Study 4a: F(1, 136) = 29.31, p < .001 and Study 4b: F(1, 101) = 16.87, p < 






for surcharged component lower bound (Study 4a: F(1, 136) = 12.46, p = .001 and 
Study 4b: F(1, 101) = 11.62, p < .001), surcharged component upper bound (Study 
4a: F(1, 136) = 23.14, p < .001 and Study 4b: F(1, 101) = 16.34, p < .001), and non-
surcharged component upper bound (Study 4a: F(1, 136) = 5.11, p = .03 and Study 
4b: F(1, 101) = 10.26, p = .002). Non-surcharged component lower bound was 
marginally higher when SM was low than when it was high (Study 4a: Ms = $66 vs. 
$42 and Study 4b: Ms = $56 vs. $31) and higher in the typical condition than in the 
atypical condition (Study 4a: Ms = $94 vs. $13 and Study 4b: Ms = $77 vs. $11). 
Similarly, the typical condition had higher means than the atypical condition for non-
surcharged component upper bound (Study 4a: Ms = $176 vs. $106 and Study 4b: Ms 
= $177 vs. $41) and lower means than the atypical condition for surcharged 
component lower bound (Study 4a: Ms = $7 vs. $44 and Study 4b: Ms = $6 vs. $17) 
and upper bound (Study 4a: Ms = $17 vs. $106 and Study 4b: Ms = $16 vs. $41), 
suggesting the role of expected component price rather than typicality as an 
underlying driver of the effects of interest. 
Discussion 
The purpose of the current study was to show the moderating role of typicality 
of partitioning on the effect of SM on preference. Consistent with H3b, the effect of 
SM in the typical conditions was attenuated in the atypical conditions. However, 
Study 4a showed a positive effect of SM in the typical conditions and Study 4b 
showed a negative effect of SM in the typical conditions, and the reason for this 
inconsistency is not clear. Perhaps the eye-tracking portion of Study 4a resulted in 






unexpected, but the Study 4b pattern was in line with predictions. At the same time, 
of the attention measures, the eye-tracked fixation count measure from Study 4a was 
consistent with H3a, but the paper-based measures in Study 4a and Study 4b were 
not. This internal inconsistency might be because of the lower fidelity of paper-based 
measures as compared to the physiological measure. Additionally, the effects of the 
typicality manipulation on expected component prices suggest a possible alternative 
explanation to the role of typicality. 
Follow-Up Studies 
To overcome the limitations of Studies 4a and 4b, we ran a follow-up study. 
Study 5 (N = 134) was a paper-based study with the same 2 × 2 design as Study 4b, 
but with the following differences: the camera brand was changed, we used a model 
with a total price in the $100 range rather than in the $500 range and a camera case 
was used as the atypical secondary component instead of the wide-angle zoom lens to 
reduce the role of component prices, and finally the low and high SMs were two-digit 
surcharges ($10.69 and $19.69). The pattern of means for preference was similar to 
Study 4b: a negative effect of SM for typical surcharges and no difference for atypical 
surcharges; however, the interactions were not significant and neither were the 
planned t-tests. At the same time, self-reported attention to the surcharge did not 
show an interaction effect, but planned t-tests revealed a significant positive effect of 
SM for typical surcharges and no difference for atypical surcharges, which is 
consistent with the eye-tracked measure of attention in Study 4a, but not with the self-
reported measures of attention in Studies 4a and 4b. Also, a typicality manipulation 






typicality, so the manipulation was not cleanly achieved. Finally, expected price 
ranges for components and controllability also varied by component, leading to 
potential confounds, due to which we are unable to make firm inferences from this 
study. 
To overcome these limitations, we ran another follow-up study. Study 6 (N = 
166) was a paper-based study with the same 2 × 2 design as Studies 4a, 4b, and 5, but 
with the following differences compared to Study 5: the secondary component was 
kept the same (lens) across conditions to rule out differences in factors such as 
benefit, controllability, and expected price range. Typicality was instead varied by 
using a norms manipulation similar to the manipulations in the experiments in 
Chapter 2: participants saw either four partitioned prices or four all-inclusive prices to 
create the norm for partitioning or not, and then they saw the target price, which had 
either a low or a high SM. The typicality manipulation was clean with only a main 
effect of typicality, but lens quality and benefit varied by condition, leading to 
potential confounds. More important, 2 × 2 ANOVAs on preference and attention did 
not reveal significant interactions or the expected pattern of means, so we are unable 
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